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The Case for Domestic Box Office Receipt 
Derivatives 
Jeremy A. Gogel* 
INTRODUCTION 
Derivatives have been given a bad rap over the last two 
years.  Following the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the ensuing 
economic collapse of 2008, many commentators and political 
figures targeted derivatives as one of the main causes of the 
financial crisis.1 Derivatives were immediately branded as 
“risky,” “complex,” and “impossible to understand,” and were 
even analogized to gambling.2  Indeed, derivatives are risky 
instruments if used carelessly, but if used properly, they provide 
a useful hedging device.  These instruments have been traded on-
exchange and over-the-counter in the United States for nearly as 
long as the country has existed, and have traded in other 
countries for millennia.3 
While the basic principles of these contracts have largely 
remained the same over time, the types of underlying assets, 
indices, or rates from which derivatives derive their value have 
expanded. Derivatives were originally used by farmers, 
processors, and end users of agricultural products to hedge 
against the risk of abrupt swings in the price of crops, but 
eventually began to be used to hedge against interest rate 
swings, credit risk, currency prices, weather changes, and even 
 
* Associate at the law firm of Baker, Sterchi, Cowden, and Rice in St. Louis, 
Missouri.  Previously, Mr. Gogel served as a judicial law clerk to the Hon. Philip M. 
Frazier of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois.  Prior to 
his clerkship, Mr. Gogel interned at the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s 
Division of Enforcement and the Office of the Missouri Secretary of State’s Securities 
Division, and volunteered at the Office of the Missouri Attorney General’s Consumer 
Protection Division.  Mr. Gogel received a J.D. and M.B.A. from the University of 
Missouri-Columbia in May, 2009, and dual B.S.B.A.s in Finance & Banking and 
Economics from the same institution in May, 2006.  While earning his law and graduate 
business degrees, Mr. Gogel taught an undergraduate course in Corporate Finance at the 
University of Missouri-Columbia. 
 1 See Dorit Samuel, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Will New Regulations Help 
Avoid Future Financial Debacles?, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 217, 220 (2009). 
 2 See, e.g., id. at 232–37. 
 3 Id. at 233. 
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death.4  Despite their wide ranging use, Congress, in response to 
the 2008 financial crisis, sought to strengthen the existing 
derivative regulations, and in doing so banned trading of 
derivatives tied to box office receipt numbers.5 
At the time Congress passed this legislation, there had never 
been any exchange trading of box office derivatives, and little to 
no over-the-counter trading of box office derivatives.6  Despite the 
lack of contribution by these instruments to the financial crisis, 
Congress nonetheless took the request by two recently created 
box office derivatives exchanges to begin listing and trading 
contracts as further evidence of the excesses and reckless 
behavior of the financial sector.7  By banning box office 
derivatives, Congress halted an opportunity to bring additional 
financing to the movie industry and potentially stifled future 
creativity in the derivative markets.8  Additionally, the ban on 
box office receipt derivatives marks the first time in nearly thirty 
years that Congress has prohibited trading of a derivative 
instrument for a specific underlying asset, and only the third 
time in U.S. history that it banned trading of derivatives for a 
specific commodity.9  After passage of the new regulations, the 
only two commodities on which derivatives cannot be traded in 
the United States are onions and box office receipts.10 
This Article will discuss the origin and regulation of 
derivatives, the purpose behind the creation of box office 
derivative exchanges, and why Congress banned the trading of 
box office derivatives.  The Article will conclude with a discussion 
of why Congress’ decision to ban box office derivatives has the 
potential to hurt the movie industry, as well as future financial 
innovation in general. 
 
 4 Don M. Chance, A Brief History of Derivatives, in ESSAYS IN DERIVATIVES 16, 17–
19 (1998). 
 5 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 721(a)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 1659 (2010). 
 6 See Todd Shields & Michael White, Box-Office Futures Market Wins U.S. 
Approval, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-
20/cantor-wins-cftc-s-approval-for-movie-futures-market-opposed-by-hollywood.html. 
 7 Letter from Tom Ashton, CEO, Vantage Advisor Group, LLC, to Andrew Wing, 
Pres. & CEO, Cantor Entertainment (Apr. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.cantorexchange.com/getdoc/6bc630b2-33e0-4eb0-9ee2-4e20c1d5bc79/Vantage-
Advisors-Letter-on-Box-Office-Futures.aspx. 
 8 Letter from Michael Burns, CEO, Lionsgate, to H.R. Comm. on Agriculture 
(Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.cantorexchange.com/getdoc/bb0c85fe-0cf1-434c-
8444-b3e2c02866ea/Lionsgate-Burns-Letter-to-House-Committee-on-Agric.aspx. 
 9 See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Reserve, Address at the Financial 
Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Georgia: Government 
Regulation and Derivative Contracts (Feb. 21, 1997) [hereinafter Greenspan, Government 
Regulation and Derivative Contracts], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
BoardDocs/Speeches/1997/19970221.htm. 
 10 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 721(a)(4). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES 
A. What are Derivatives? 
A derivative is a “financial instrument whose value depends 
on or is derived from the performance of a secondary source such 
as an underlying bond, currency, or commodity.”11  There is no 
singular type of derivative instrument, but rather, a family of 
instruments who derive their values from reference points.12  
These reference points can be currency exchange rates, interest 
rates set by financial institutions, prices of securities such as 
stocks or bonds, prices of physical commodities such as precious 
metals or harvested farm products, weather patterns,13 and even 
mortality dates.14 
The most common derivative instruments are forward and 
futures contracts, swaps, and options, with each having distinct 
payment and/or delivery terms.15  Futures and options are used 
for hedging (i.e., shifting the risk of price changes to those who 
are more willing or able to assume this risk), or for speculation 
(i.e., investing with the intent of profiting from price changes).16  
Swaps and forwards are “typically used to hedge or to obtain 
more desirable financing.”17  Swaps can be used to speculate, but 
are generally not used as frequently for this purpose because of 
the relatively high transaction costs compared to those of other 
derivatives.18  Thus, only participants willing to operate on a 
 
 11 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 374 (9th ed. 2005). 
 12 See Samuel, supra note 1, at 233. 
 13 Various weather derivative products are traded on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange. These products typically derive their values from fluctuations in temperatures.  
For an overview, see J. SCOTT MATHEWS, CME GROUP, WEATHER PRODUCTS: DOG DAYS 
AND DEGREE DAYS (2009), available at http://www.cmegroup.com/ 
trading/weather/files/WT133_Weather_White_Paper_Final.pdf; Bob Dischel, Weather 
Risk Management at the ‘Frozen Falls Fuel Company,’ CME GROUP, 
http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/weather/files/WEA_weather_risk.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2010). 
 14 Cris Sholto Heaton, Have Financial Wizards Found a Way to Outwit Death?, 
MONEYWEEK (Nov. 24, 2006), http://www.moneyweek.com/investments/have-financial-
wizards-found-a-way-to-outwit-death.aspx. 
 15 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-94-133, FINANCIAL 
DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 26 (1994) 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES], available at http://archive.gao.gov/ 
t2pbat3/151647.pdf.  More complex derivatives can be created by combining the elements 
of basic derivatives.  For example, a swaption gives the holder the option, but not the 
obligation, to enter into a swap on or before a specified future date.  An interest rate cap 
(or floor) agreement is a derivative in which the buyer receives payments at the end of 
each period in which the interest rate exceeds (or is below) the specified reference rate. 
See id. at 172. 
 16 Id. at 25. 
 17 Id. at 26. 
 18 Id. 
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large scale have the potential to make swap speculation 
worthwhile. 
Forward and futures contracts are similar, except that a 
forward contract is negotiated, settled, and cleared privately 
between two parties, while a futures contract is entered into on 
an exchange, settled, and cleared by a central clearing party 
(CCP).19  An individual who buys a forward or futures contract 
assumes what is known as a “long” position.20  The seller of a 
forward or futures contract assumes what is known as a “short” 
position.21  The two parties, by taking these positions, assume the 
respective obligation to buy and sell the underlying asset at a 
specific price sometime in the future.22  The holder of a long 
position benefits when the price of the underlying asset 
increases, while the holder of a short position benefits when the 
price of the underlying asset decreases.23  A party to a futures 
contract has two choices on how to liquidate its position.  The 
first option is to liquidate the position prior to the settlement 
date.24  This option requires the party to take an offsetting 
position in the same contract.25  For the buyer of a futures 
contract, “this means selling the same number of identical 
futures contracts; for the seller of a futures contract, this means 
buying the same number of identical futures contracts.”26  
Alternatively, a party can wait until the contract settlement 
date.27  Then, “the party purchasing a futures contract accepts 
delivery” of the underlying asset, or settlement is made in cash.28  
 
 19 Clearance is the process of acquiring trade data, comparing buyer and seller 
versions of the data, and guaranteeing that the trade will settle once the data is matched.  
Settlement is the process of determining the daily closing price for each contract and 
collecting losses from clearing members carrying losing positions and making payments to 
clearing members carrying gaining positions. See EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & MICHAEL C. 
EHRHARDT, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 827–28 (12th ed. 2008). 
 20 Frequently Asked Questions About Futures Trading, GOWEBTRADE, 
http://www.gowebtrade.com/ztrading-products/futures (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
 21 Id. 
 22 BRIGHAM & EHRHARDT, supra note 19, at 827. 
 23 For instance, imagine that Party A bought a futures contract from Party B, 
whereby Party A would purchase 100 barrels of crude oil from Party B for $100 per barrel 
in one year.  If, in one year, the price of crude oil is selling for $125 per barrel, Party A 
would be the “winner” because he is saving $25 per barrel.  Party B, on the other hand, 
would be the “loser” because he is selling his oil at a $25 per barrel discount.  Of course, 
the opposite would be true if the price of oil were selling for $75 per barrel in one year. See 
GARY SHOUP, CURRENCY RISK MANAGEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR FINANCIAL MANAGERS, 
BROKERS, AND THEIR CONSULTANTS 75 (1998). 
 24 PETER K NEVITT & FRANK J. FABOZZI, PROJECT FINANCING 230 (7th ed. 2000) 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
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Because forward contracts are privately negotiated, it is up to the 
parties to determine how the positions can be liquidated.29 
Option contracts give the purchaser the right to buy (call 
option) or sell (put option) a specified asset at a particular price 
(exercise price) on or before a certain future date.30  In exchange 
for the right to buy or sell the particular asset, the purchaser 
pays the seller (writer) a certain amount (option premium).31  
Options are different from forwards and futures in that they do 
not create an obligation on the part of the purchaser to buy or 
sell the underlying asset.32  Options that expire without being 
exercised do so with no value.  Thus, a purchaser of an option 
would only lose his option premium if he decides not to exercise 
the option.33  Options, like futures, may be exchange-traded, or, 
like forwards, may be privately negotiated.34  Additionally, the 
buyer of an option assumes a long position, while the writer of an 
option assumes a short position.35 
A swap transaction is similar to a forward or futures 
contract, except that it has a multiple period structure with 
corresponding multiple payments.36  For instance, in a fixed-for-
floating interest rate swap:  
[O]ne party agrees to pay an amount equal to a stated fixed interest 
rate applied to a notional amount, and the other party agrees to pay 
an amount determined by reference to the value of a specified floating 
interest rate (e.g., LIBOR) for the applicable period as applied to the 
same notional amount.37 
The number of periods for which the swap applies to is 
predetermined by the parties.38  In addition to fixed-for-floating 
 
 29 Id. 
 30 See GAO REPORT ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES, supra note 15, at 27. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 For instance, imagine that Party A owns one share of stock in XYZ, Corp.  Party A 
decides to sell Party B the right to buy this share for $45 within the next six months.  The 
premium on this call option is $5.  As soon as the price of XYZ’s stock exceeds $50, 
Party A would exercise his option, and purchase the stock, because at that point, the sum 
of the exercise price and option premium is less than the price of the stock.  Depending on 
the terms of the option contract, there may be a transfer of ownership of the stock from 
the option writer to the option buyer, or the option writer may merely pay the option 
purchaser the difference between the sum of the exercise price and option premium, and 
the market price of the stock at the time the option is exercised.  If the price of XYZ’s 
stock drops, however, Party A would simply let the option expire, and simply pay (if he 
had not done so already) Party B the option premium. See id. 
 34 Id. at 26–27. 
 35 See NEVITT & FABOZZI, supra note 24, at 245. 
 36 Mark A. Guinn & William L. Harvey, Taking OTC Derivative Contracts as 
Collateral, 57 BUS. LAW. 1127, 1131 (2002). 
 37 Id. 
 38 For instance, imagine that Party A owns a bond with a $1,000 par value paying a 
fixed interest rate of 5% compounded annually.  If Party B owns a similar bond paying a 
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swaps, parties can enter into fixed-for-fixed swaps, floating-for-
floating swaps, or any combination they desire.39  Parties can 
also enter into swap transactions where the occurrence of a 
particular event (e.g., default on mortgage payments) would 
require clearance and settlement between the parties.40  Other 
similar transactions include currency and commodity swaps.  
Historically, swaps have been entered into privately between the 
parties because of their unique nature; however, recent 
legislation has created a presumption that these types of 
contracts will be cleared through a CCP going forward.41  Swaps 
enjoy higher transactions costs than exchange-traded derivatives 
due to their unique nature, which sometimes require extensive 
negotiations between the parties.42 
B. How Are Derivatives Regulated? 
As noted above, derivatives fall into two main categories.  
One category consists of standardized, exchange-traded 
instruments, while the other category consists of customized, 
privately negotiated instruments known as over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives.43  Although many derivative contracts have 
historically been exchange-traded, the number of OTC 
derivatives far outnumbers the size of the exchange-traded 
contracts market.44  These contracts differ in the ways they are 
regulated. 
 
floating interest rate tied to the LIBOR, Party B may want to hedge against the risk of 
the interest rate plummeting, and simultaneously guarantee a known, steady stream of 
income.  Party A, on the other hand, may want to trade the guaranteed interest payments 
for the possibility of larger interest payments.  Thus, if the two parties enter into an 
interest rate swap transaction, when the interest is paid on the two bonds, any interest 
payments above $50 would have to be paid from Party B to Party A.  Conversely, if 
Party B received less than $50 in interest at the end of the year, Party A would have to 
pay Party B the difference between what he was actually paid, and the $50.  Note that 
Party B will never receive more or less than $50 in this transaction, but that Party A has 
the potential to earn more than $50, as well as the potential to earn less than $50.  It 
should also be clear that ownership of the underlying instruments—in this case, the 
bonds—never switches hands. See Samuel, supra note 1, at 237. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Kathryn M. Trkla, Implications of the Financial Reform Legislation for Derivatives 
Activities, LEGAL NEWS ALERT, July 2010, at 2, available at http://www.foley.com/ 
abc.aspx?Publication=7351. 
 41 See infra Part I.B.1.ii. 
 42 Patrick Casabona, Derivatives, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS AND FINANCE 
235, 237 (Burton S. Kaliski ed., 2001). 
 43 Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES 
ASS’N, INC., http://www.isda.org/index.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
 44 Regular OTC Derivatives Market Statistics, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 
(Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0911.htm.  The Bank of International 
Settlements estimates that the total notional amount of outstanding OTC contracts at the 
end of June 2009 was $605 trillion. Id.  This amount is contrasted with the GAO’s 
estimate of the notional amount of all outstanding derivatives contracts (including 
exchange traded contracts) at the end of the 1992 fiscal year which was $12.1 trillion. See 
Do Not Delete 3/16/2011 5:16 PM 
2011] Case for Domestic Box Office Receipt Derivatives 421 
1.  Exchange-Traded Derivatives Regulation 
Exchange-traded derivatives are primarily regulated by two 
federal government agencies—the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC), and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).45 
i.  CFTC Regulation 
U.S. derivatives regulation began during the Civil War when 
Congress passed the Anti-Gold Futures Act.46  The Act was 
passed in response to the significant discount at which the 
Union’s “fiat currency”—known as the greenbacks—was trading 
in comparison to gold.47  The Act made it unlawful to enter into 
any contract for the purchase of gold coin, gold bullion, or foreign 
exchange to be delivered on any day after the making of such a 
contract.48  Unfortunately, instead of stabilizing the price of the 
greenbacks, Congress’ attempt at regulating gold and foreign 
currency futures led to the further decline in the value of the 
greenbacks.49  As a result, Congress repealed the Act only two 
weeks after it was enacted.50 
Between the years of 1880 and 1920, Congress introduced 
approximately two hundred bills that would regulate futures 
exchanges, but none of this proposed legislation passed.51  
Congress’ next attempt to regulate futures came in 1921 when it 
passed the Future Trading Act.52  The Future Trading Act 
imposed a twenty cent tax per bushel on every grain futures 
contract, but exempted sales on boards of trade designated as 
contract markets by the Secretary of Agriculture from this 
 
GAO REPORT ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES, supra note 15, at 34.  See also Committee 
Report on the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 
29 (2010), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/S3217ReportASFILED.pdf 
(“By 2008, 59 percent of derivatives were traded over-the-counter, or away from regulated 
exchanges, compared to 41 percent in 1998.”). 
 45 OTC Derivatives Oversight: Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/International/ 
InternationalInitiatives/oia_otcderovst.html (last visited October 10, 2010). 
 46 Anti-Gold Futures Act, ch. 127, 13 Stat. 132 (1864). 
 47 Greenspan, Government Regulation and Derivative Contracts, supra note 9. 
 48 Anti-Gold Futures Act, 13 Stat. at 132. 
 49 Greenspan, Government Regulation and Derivative Contracts, supra note 9. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC—A Clash of Cultures, 78 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 537, 564 (2009).  It should be noted, however, that in 1914, Congress passed the 
Cotton Futures Act, which established a system for grading cotton and prohibiting all 
cotton futures contracts other than those specified in the Act.  The Act was eventually 
declared unconstitutional because it was passed under Congress’s taxing power, but did 
not originate in the House, and was then replaced by the Cotton Futures Act of 1916. See 
Cotton Futures Act Called Void, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1915. 
 52 Future Trading Act, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921). 
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requirement.53  The purpose of this regulation was to prevent 
market manipulation by requiring exchanges seeking a contract 
market designation to introduce anti-manipulation rules.54  The 
twenty cent tax on non-contract market trades made it nearly 
impossible to make a profit, and therefore, the Act essentially 
coerced trades to be executed on designated contract boards.55  
Soon after the Act was passed, however, eight members of the 
Chicago Board of Trade sued, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
eventually declared the Act unconstitutional.56 
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision, Congress 
passed the Grain Futures Act of 1922.57  The purpose of the 
Grain Futures Act was to regulate interstate transactions on 
grain futures exchanges.58  Once again, the constitutionality of 
the Act was called into question, requiring another Supreme 
Court decision.59  In distinguishing the two acts, the Court stated 
that:  
The Grain Futures Act which is now before us differs from the Future 
Trading Act in having the very features the absence of which we 
held . . . prevented our sustaining the Future Trading Act.  As we 
have seen in the statement of the case, the [Grain Futures Act] only 
purports to regulate interstate commerce and sales of grain for future 
delivery on boards of trade because . . . manipulation . . . [of these 
markets] . . . [has] become a constantly recurring burden and 
obstruction to [interstate] commerce.  Instead, therefore, of being an 
authority against the validity of the Grain Futures Act, it is an 
authority in its favor.60 
In the end, the Court held that the Act’s emphasis on 
limiting price manipulation in the futures markets—an event 
which had the potential to adversely affect interstate 
commerce—was enough to make the Act constitutional under the 
commerce clause.61 
The Grain Futures Act remained in effect until June 15, 
1936, when Congress passed the Commodity Exchange Act 
 
 53 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 45 (1921). 
 54 Id. at 51. 
 55 Id. at 71. 
 56 Id. at 70.  Ultimately, the Court determined that the grain futures contracts at 
issue were wholly intrastate transactions, and that the assessment of a twenty cent tax 
was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ taxing power. See id. at 70–72. 
 57 Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922). 
 58 In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill v. Wallace, Congress expressly 
limited the provisions of the Grain Futures Act to boards of trade and individuals 
conducting interstate transactions. See id. at § 3. 
 59 See Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923). 
 60 Id. at 32–33 (1923). 
 61 Id. at 41–42. 
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(CEA).62  The CEA, which has been amended numerous times 
over the past seventy-five years, created the Commodity 
Exchange Authority, a precursor agency to the CFTC.63  The 
CFTC—an independent regulatory agency—was created in 1974 
when Congress passed the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission Act of 1974 (CFTCA).64  With some minor 
exceptions, the CEA grants the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over 
all commodity futures and commodity options contracts.65 
At the beginning of the new millennium, Congress again 
passed a major piece of legislation amending the CEA.  The 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) divided 
the universe of commodities into three general categories; 
(1) agricultural commodities; (2) exempt commodities; and 
(3) excluded commodities.66  This categorization was based on the 
apparent susceptibility of certain commodities to manipulation, 
with agricultural commodities seen as most vulnerable, exempt 
commodities as less vulnerable, and excluded commodities as the 
least vulnerable.67 
With respect to agricultural commodities, the CEA 
specifically enumerates certain articles or goods as 
commodities.68  In addition to these specified commodities, the 
 
 62 Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current version at 7 
U.S.C. §§ 1–17 (2006)). 
 63 See Records of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/180.html (last visited Oct. 7, 
2010).  See also Jerry W. Markham, The Commodity Exchange Monopoly—Reform Is 
Needed, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 977, 982 (1991) (“Rather than being an independent 
federal agency, such as the SEC, the Commodity Exchange Commission was composed of 
the Secretaries of the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce and the Attorney 
General of the United States.  Day-to-day regulation of the statute was given to the 
Secretary of Agriculture who assigned this duty to an agency within the department, the 
Commodity Exchange Authority.”). 
 64 Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat 1389 
(1974) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2006)). 
 65 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b) (2006) provides that: “No person shall . . . enter into . . . any 
transaction involving any commodity regulated under this chapter which is of the 
character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an ‘option’ . . . contrary to any rule, 
regulation, or order of the Commission . . . .”  § 2(a)(1)(A) provides that: “The Commission 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . with respect to accounts, agreements . . . and 
transactions [including options] involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future 
delivery . . . .” 
 66 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 5660, 106th Cong. (2d sess. 
2000). 
 67 See H.R. 5660, 106th Cong. § 5a(b)(2)(B) (“A registered derivatives transaction 
execution facility may trade any contract of sale of a commodity for future trading . . . only 
if . . . (B) the underlying commodity has a deliverable supply that is sufficiently large that 
the contract is highly unlikely to be susceptible to the threat of manipulation . . . .”). 
 68 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4) enumerates the following commodities: 
[W]heat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill 
feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats 
and oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and all 
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term commodity also includes those articles, goods, services, 
rights, or interests “in which contracts for future delivery are 
presently or in the future dealt in.”69  Therefore, an underlying 
interest that is not enumerated in the CEA may nonetheless be a 
statutory commodity under the Act if it can reasonably underlie a 
futures contract on a forward looking basis. 
The CEA defines an exempt commodity to mean “a 
commodity that is not an excluded commodity or an agricultural 
commodity.”70  The types of commodities that fit within this 
definition include oil, gas, electric power, and precious and base 
metals.71 
Finally, the CEA identifies certain interests as excluded 
commodities, thereby giving further depth to the regulatory 
purview of the CFTC.72  The definition of an excluded commodity 
is comprised of four subsections, and allows for trading of 
contracts based on an enumerated list of commercial or economic 
indices or rates, whether within the control of contracting parties 
or not, and whether these indices or rates are based on 
commodities that have no cash market.73  The definition of an 
excluded commodity, therefore, appears to open the door to 
commodity futures or options contracts based on a wide variety of 
events that have an economic consequence. 
 
other fats and oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean 
meal, livestock, livestock products, and frozen concentrated orange juice . . . . 
 69 Id. 
 70 § 1a(14). 
 71 Congress Re-Enacts Amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act, LEGAL NEWS 
ALERT (Foley & Lardner LLP), June 26, 2008, available at http://www.foley.com/ 
publications/pub_detail.aspx?pubid=5059. 
 72 § 1a(13). 
 73 The Act defines “excluded commodity” as: 
(i) an interest rate, exchange rate, currency, security, security index, credit risk 
or measure, debt or equity instrument, index or measure of inflation, or other 
macroeconomic index or measure;  
(ii) any other rate, differential, index, or measure of economic or commercial 
risk, return, or value that is– 
  (I) not based in substantial part on the value of a narrow group of 
commodities not described in clause (i); or  
  (II) based solely on one or more commodities that have no cash market;  
(iii) any economic or commercial index based on prices, rates, values, or levels 
that are not within the control of any party to the relevant contract, 
agreement, or transaction; or  
(iv) an occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency (other than a change 
in the price, rate, value, or level of a commodity not described in clause (i)) that 
is– 
  (I) beyond the control of the parties to the relevant contract, agreement, or 
transaction; and  
  (II) associated with a financial, commercial, or economic consequence. 
Id. 
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ii.  SEC Regulation 
As stated above, in order for the CFTC to retain sole 
jurisdiction over a particular derivatives contract, the contract 
must involve the sale or future delivery of a commodity.74  In 
1972, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) created the 
International Monetary Market (IMM) to offer futures contracts 
in foreign currencies.75  The creation of the IMM began an 
explosion of derivatives for non-agricultural products.  Because 
these products were not easily defined as commodities, it was not 
entirely clear that the CFTC retained jurisdictional authority 
over them.  Some of these products either partially or entirely 
contain features of securities, over which the SEC has 
jurisdiction. 
In 1934, Congress granted the SEC jurisdiction over all 
security options products when it passed the Securities Exchange 
Act (Exchange Act), and subjected options to the rulemaking 
authority of the SEC.76  The SEC did not adopt any such rule 
until 1974, however, until after the creation of the Chicago Board 
of Options Exchange when it adopted Rule 9b-1.77  Options 
trading after the adoption of Rule 9b-1 was on a “pilot basis” only 
in order for the SEC to learn about any potential problems that 
could cause harm to investors.  Rule 9b-1, until it was repealed in 
1975,78 prohibited options trading on any exchange except in 
accordance with a plan regulating options trading approved by 
the SEC.79  The SEC retains jurisdiction over security options 
trading to this day.  Thus, the SEC retains sole or joint 
jurisdiction over security futures and security options products.80 
Since the creation of the CFTC, the two agencies have often 
battled over which agency has jurisdiction over certain financial 
derivatives.  These jurisdictional battles eventually led to the 
Shad-Johnson Jurisdictional Accord (accord).81  The accord was 
 
 74 § 2(i). 
 75 From Water Street to the World—A Brief History of the Chicago Board of Trade 
and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, CME MAGAZINE, Summer 2007, available at  
http://www.cmegroup.com/company/history/magazine/Summer2007/FromWaterStreetToT
heWorld.html. 
 76 See 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2000). 
 77 17 C.F.R. § 240.9b-1 (1974). 
 78 Jerry W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options—Two 
Regulatory Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 ALB. L. REV. 741, 748 & n.34 (1982). 
 79 See § 240.9b-1(a). 
 80 See Advisory on Dodd-Frank Act: New Rules for Derivatives, COVINGTON & 
BURLINGTON LLP (July 21, 2010), http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/f11bd6db-d8f2-
46d1-b91b-da0b30a44157/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/88322576-8e12-48ab-8c61-
daca964bb4e0/Dodd-Frank%20Act%20-%20New%20Rules%20for%20Derivatives.pdf. 
 81 The accord was codified in the Securities Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
303, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982).  It was the result of an agreement between the Commodity 
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an agreement reached between the Chairmen of SEC and CFTC 
to resolve a dispute concerning jurisdiction over securities-based 
derivatives.82  Under the accord, the CFTC retained exclusive 
jurisdiction over all futures contracts and options on both futures 
contracts and physical commodities.83  The CFTC was also given 
jurisdiction over options on foreign currencies not traded on 
national securities exchanges, and futures and options on futures 
on securities indexes and exempted securities.84  The accord 
allowed the CFTC to approve a stock index futures contract for 
trading if it (1) was settled in cash; (2) not readily susceptible to 
manipulation; and (3) derived from a substantial segment of a 
publicly traded group or index of equity or debt securities, called 
broad-based indexes.85  These contracts were also subject to 
initial SEC review for compliance with these requirements, and 
the SEC was given the authority to prohibit the trading of these 
contracts if the SEC determined that these requirements were 
not met.86  Also under the accord, the SEC retained jurisdiction 
over securities, including options on securities, options on 
certificates of deposit, options on securities indexes, and options 
on foreign currency traded on a national securities exchange.87  
Because the two agencies could not resolve their jurisdictional 
differences with respect to single security futures contract, these 
contracts were banned for nearly twenty years until the CFMA 
 
Futures Trading Commission’s Chairman, Phil Johnson, and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Chairman, John Shad, to clarify jurisdictional concerns between the two 
agencies and their respective products. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO/GGD-00-89, CFTC AND SEC: ISSUES RELATED TO THE SHAD-JOHNSON 
JURISDICTIONAL ACCORD 6 (2000) [hereinafter CFTC AND SEC—ISSUES RELATED TO THE 
SHAD-JOHNSON JURISDICTIONAL ACCORD], available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/ 
2000/gg00089.pdf (“First, [the accord] provided SEC with jurisdiction over securities-
based options, including stocks and stock indexes.  Second, the accord prohibited futures 
(and options thereon) on single corporate and municipal securities . . . .  Finally, the 
accord provided CFTC with jurisdiction over futures (and options thereon) on exempted 
securities (other than municipal securities) and stock indexes.  The accord allowed CFTC 
to approve a stock index futures contract for trading if CFTC found that the contract was 
(1) settled in cash; (2) not readily susceptible to manipulation; and (3) based on an index 
that either was a widely published measure of and reflected the market as a whole or a 
substantial segment of the market, or else was comparable to such a measure.  According 
to SEC and CFTC, these three standards were intended to ensure that stock index futures 
would not be readily susceptible to manipulation, be used to manipulate the underlying 
securities or related options markets, or serve as a surrogate for a single stock futures 
contract.”). 
 82 See CFTC AND SEC—ISSUES RELATED TO THE SHAD-JOHNSON JURISDICTIONAL 
ACCORD, supra note 81, at 5. 
 83 Id. at 6. 
 84 Id. at 6 & n.13 (“Exempted securities include securities issued or guaranteed by 
the United States, the District of Columbia, or any U.S. state.”). 
 85 Id. at 6. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
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once again allowed trading of these instruments.88  Today, 
regulation of security futures—instruments considered to be both 
securities and futures—is jointly shared by the CFTC and the 
SEC. 
Despite the various amendments to the CEA and Exchange 
Act over the past thirty-five years, the jurisdictional battles 
between the CFTC and SEC have continued.  At no time was this 
battle more intense than during the mid- to late-1990s, when the 
two agencies failed to agree on how to regulate OTC 
derivatives.89  The CFMA failed to clarify jurisdictional authority 
over OTC derivatives—a decision that would ultimately haunt 
the U.S. and world financial markets in the years to come. 
2.  Over-the-Counter Derivatives Regulation 
Following the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the ensuing 
financial collapse of 2008, calls were made by members of 
Congress, as well as consumer and investor protection groups, to 
regulate the OTC derivatives market.  As stated previously, OTC 
contracts are entered into privately, off-exchange by parties.  
Because these are private contracts, the parties retain control 
over settlement and clearing. Despite the impact these 
instruments have on the U.S. and international economies, they 
remained largely unregulated by either the CFTC or the SEC.90 
 
 88 See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(32) (2000) (“The term ‘security futures product’ means a security 
future or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security future.”). 
 89 See Ted Bunker, Power Grab Threatens OTC Derivatives Market, BOSTON 
HERALD, June 22, 1998, at 26; Willa E. Gibson, Are Swap Agreements Securities or 
Futures? The Inadequacies of Applying the Traditional Regulatory Approach to OTC 
Derivatives Transactions, 24 J. CORP. L. 379, 388, 390–91 (1999) (“In December 1997, the 
SEC proposed a rule to allow broker-dealers selling OTC derivatives . . . to establish 
designated subsidiaries for their OTC transactions in the U.S.  The designated 
subsidiaries would be allowed to register with the SEC as an alternative to registration as 
a fully regulated broker-dealer under Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act if they combine 
their business in securities and non-securities OTC derivatives products. . . .  The CFTC 
responded . . . by stating that the proposed rule infringed upon the CFTC’s jurisdictional 
authority over OTC derivatives transactions . . . because only a small percentage of OTC 
derivatives were securities.”).  Nonetheless, the rule took effect on January 4, 1999. Id. 
 90 In a 1994 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), the director 
of the GAO (and U.S. Comptroller General) stated: 
Given the weaknesses and gaps that impede regulatory preparedness for 
dealing with a crisis associated with derivatives, GAO recommends that 
Congress require federal regulation of the safety and soundness of all major 
U.S. OTC derivatives dealers.  Regulators should attempt to prevent financial 
disruptions from turning into crises and resolve crises to minimize risks to the 
financial system . . . .  The immediate need is for Congress to bring the 
currently unregulated OTC derivatives activities of securities firm and 
insurance company affiliates under the purview of one or more of the existing 
federal financial regulators and to ensure that derivatives regulation is 
consistent and comprehensive across regulatory agencies. 
See GAO REPORT ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES, supra note 15, at 14. 
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The most infamous OTC derivative contract during the 2008 
financial crisis was the credit default swap (CDS).91  CDSs are 
bilateral contracts used to transfer risk between protection 
buyers and protection sellers.92  As one recent commentator 
stated, “CDSs have provided an important tool for risk 
management.  They enable banks and other financial institutions 
to hedge the credit risk of lending to corporations, in turn 
facilitating economic activity.  Hedging credit risk arguably frees 
up funds to be lent elsewhere, making more capital available for 
financings, which can reduce the cost of borrowing.”93  CDSs were 
invented by Wall Street Banks in the late 1990s, but the size of 
the market is estimated to have increased from a notional value 
of $632 billion in 2001, to over $54.6 trillion in notional value by 
mid 2008.94 
 
 91 See Market Survey, ISDA, http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/ISDA-Market-Survey-
annual-data.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).  
 92 David Mengle, Credit Derivatives: An Overview, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA 
ECON. REV., Fourth Quarter 2007, at 1, available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/ 
filelegacydocs/erq407_mengle.pdf. 
 93 Janis Sarra, Financial Market Destabilization and the Role of Credit Default 
Swaps: An International Perspective On The SEC’s Role Going Forward, 78 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 629, 632 (2009).  The underlying debate regarding CDSs has existed for centuries. 
See Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Keynote 
Address at Markit’s Outlook for OTC Derivatives Markets Conference (Mar. 9, 2010), 
available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/ChairmanGaryGensler/ 
opagensler-32.html (“Though credit default swaps have existed for only a relatively short 
period of time, the debate they evoke has parallels to debates as far back as 18th Century 
England over insurance and the role of speculators.  English insurance underwriters in 
the 1700s often sold insurance on ships to individuals who did not own the vessels or their 
cargo.  The practice was said to create an incentive to buy protection and then seek to 
destroy the insured property.  It should come as no surprise that seaworthy ships began 
sinking.  In 1746, the English Parliament enacted the Statute of George II, which 
recognized that ‘a mischievous kind of gaming or wagering’ had caused ‘great numbers of 
ships, with their cargoes, [to] have . . . been fraudulently lost and destroyed.’  The statute 
established that protection for shipping risks not supported by an interest in the 
underlying vessel would be ‘null and void to all intents and purposes.’”). 
 94 See Mengle, Credit Derivatives, supra note 92, at 7; News Release: ISDA Mid-Year 
2008 Market Survey Shows Credit Derivatives at $54.6 Trillion, INT’L SWAPS & 
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC. (Sept. 24, 2008), http://www.isda.org/press/press092508.html.  
For a criticism of the use of notional amount to measure privately negotiated derivatives, 
see Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(testimony of Robert Pickel, Chief Executive Officer, International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association, Testimony Before the Committee on Banking), available at 
http://www.isda.org/press/pdf/Testimony-of-Robert-Pickel031009.pdf (“While using 
notional amount as a measurement tool for the size of the privately negotiated derivatives 
business has its benefits, it also has a major drawback.  Notional amount greatly 
overstates the actual exposure represented by the CDS business.  One reason for this is 
because a seller of protection often seeks to hedge its risk by entering into offsetting 
transactions.  Using the example above, if the counterparty that sold $10 million of 
protection wished to hedge its risk and buy protection, it too would enter into a 
$10 million CDS contract.  Thus, there are now two CDS contracts outstanding with a 
total notional amount of $20 million.  The reality is, however, that only $10 million is at 
risk.”). 
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On July 21, 2010, the President of the United States signed 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (Financial Reform Act) into law.95  Title VII of the Financial 
Reform Act—known as the Wall Street Transparency and 
Accountability Act of 2010 (WSTA)—confers jurisdiction of 
security-based swaps to the SEC, and all other swaps to the 
CFTC.96  Security-based swaps are also added to the definition of 
a “security” in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act.97  
As such, an offer or sale of a security-based swap by or on behalf 
of the issuer of the underlying security, its affiliate or 
underwriter is considered an offer or sale of the underlying 
security.  There is no requirement that the SEC deem an owner 
of a security-based swap to be the beneficial owner of the 
underlying security, or that the security-based swap have 
“incidents of ownership comparable to direct ownership of the 
equity security.”98 Both agencies share joint regulatory 
jurisdiction over “mixed swaps.”99 
The WSTA requires that all swaps and security-based swaps 
be cleared, unless an exemption exists.100  The CFTC and SEC 
may exempt a swap or security-based swap from clearing if: 
(1) the swap or security-based swap is not accepted for clearing 
by a derivatives clearing organization (DCO) or a clearing agency 
or (2) one party to the contract is not a dealer or major swap or 
security-based swap participant and that party does not meet the 
eligibility requirement of a DCO/clearing agency.101 All 
derivatives clearing organizations are required to submit to the 
CFTC for prior approval any swaps the organization seeks to 
accept for clearing.102  The CFTC or SEC can stay the clearing 
requirement of a swap or security-based swap that it has 
 
 95 H.R. 4173: Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-4173 (last visited Nov. 
8, 2010). 
 96 See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. §§ 712(b)(1)–(2) (2010). 
 97 §§ 761(a), 768(a) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) and 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1), 
respectively). 
 98 15 U.S.C.S. § 78m(o) (LEXIS through P.L. 111-237). 
 99 H.R. 4173 § 712(a)(8); 7 U.S.C.S. § 1a(49)(D) (LEXIS through P.L. 111-267) (“The 
term ‘security-based swap’ includes any agreement, contract, or transaction that is as 
described in section 3(a)(68)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 
[§] 78c(a)(68)(A)) and also is based on the value of one or more interest or other rates, 
currencies, commodities, instruments of indebtedness, indices, quantitative measures, 
other financial or economic interest or property of any kind (other than a single security 
or a narrow-based security index), or the occurrence, non-occurrence, or the extent of the 
occurrence of an event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic, or 
commercial consequence.”). 
 100 H.R. 4173 §§ 723(a), 763(a) (amending 7 U.S.C. § 2(e)(3) and 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78a(3C)(a), respectively). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
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approved for listing upon request of either party to the contract, 
or on its own, and must then determine within ninety days 
whether the product does or does not need to be cleared.103  A 
product that the CFTC or SEC determines does not need to be 
cleared is still allowed to be cleared.104 
The WSTA, therefore, creates a presumption that OTC 
swaps will be cleared through a CCP.  Additionally, the WSTA 
requires both the CFTC and SEC to adopt rules requiring 
maintenance of records of uncleared swap and security-based 
swap transactions, respectively, to be made available to one 
another.105  Thus, the new legislation confers whole or partial 
jurisdiction over most OTC swap transactions, which, along with 
the existing jurisdiction over futures and options by the CFTC 
and SEC, creates various degrees of regulatory regimes for 
nearly all derivative contracts. 
By passing the WSTA, Congress took the opportunity to not 
only increase regulation of OTC derivatives, but also to address 
the potential for on-exchange trading of specific information 
aggregation derivative contracts; namely, contracts based on box 
office receipt numbers. 
II.  DOMESTIC BOX OFFICE RECEIPT DERIVATIVE CONTRACTS 
In 2008, in response to a substantial number of requests 
asking for guidance on the offering and trading of “information 
aggregation” financial contracts, the CFTC issued a concept 
release on the appropriate regulatory treatment of event based 
contracts.106  As the CFTC’s release summarized:  
These event contracts generally take the form of financial agreements 
linked to eventualities or measures that neither derive from, nor 
correlate with, market prices or broad economic or commercial 
measures.  Event contracts have been based on a wide variety of 
interests including the results of presidential elections, the 
accomplishment of certain scientific advances, world population 
levels, the adoption of particular pieces of legislation, the outcome of 
corporate product sales, the declaration of war and the length of 
celebrity marriages.107 
 
 103 H.R. 4173 §§ 723(a), 763(a) (amending 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(1) and 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78a(3C)(i), respectively). 
 104 Id. 
 105 § 712(d)(1)–(3). 
 106 Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 
E8-9981, 73 Fed. Reg. 25669 (May 7, 2008) [hereinafter Concept Release on the 
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Events Contracts], available at http://www.cftc.gov/ 
LawRegulation/FederalRegister/e8-9981.html. 
 107 Id. 
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Among the reasons for issuing the concept release were to help 
determine: (1) whether event based contracts are within the 
CFTC’s jurisdiction; (2) if the CFTC does, in fact, have 
jurisdiction over these contracts, whether there should be 
exemptions or exclusions applied to them; and (3) how to address 
potential gambling aspect of some of these contracts.108 
A. Benefits of Information Markets 
An event based market is generically known as an 
“information market.”109  An information market is a relatively 
simple operation.  The market maker issues a security or 
derivative and specifies how these instruments will eventually be 
redeemed or settled.110  The various instruments’ payout will be 
based on objectively verifiable information at the time of 
redemption or settlement (e.g., whether the Federal Reserve 
changes the federal funds target rate).111  Individuals who wish 
to participate in these markets purchase financial instruments 
from the market and subsequently trade these instruments (or 
purchase offsetting contracts in the case of derivatives) with one 
another.112  The prices at which these transactions occur reflect 
market predictions of the eventual payout, and thus, whether the 
participants believe a certain event is likely to occur.113 
Proponents of information markets point to the efficient 
markets hypothesis, which, in essence, states that it is 
impossible to beat the market because market efficiency causes 
the prices of financial instruments to immediately incorporate 
and reflect all relevant information.114  In other words, stocks 
traded on a public exchange will always trade at their fair value, 
making it impossible for investors to purchase undervalued 
stocks or sell inflated stocks.  Thus, the hypothesis maintains 
that it is impossible to outperform the overall market.  In an 
efficient information market, the market price of the financial 
instrument will theoretically be the best indicator of whether an 
event will actually occur or not, and no combination of polling or 
other information gathering techniques can in any way improve 
upon the market generated forecasts.  The advantage of having a 
price signal market for information is that the market aggregates 
the publicly and privately known information, as well as the 
 
 108 Id. 
 109 Matthew Einbinder, Information Markets: Using Market Predictions to Make 
Administrative Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 149, 150 (2006). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 151. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1575 (1991). 
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tastes of a large number of participants, which produce 
judgments that incorporate more data than could be assembled 
centrally.115 
In order for these markets to perform as advertised, though, 
market participants must trade rationally.  Rational trading is 
certain to occur in these markets by virtue of the fact that 
market participants have a financial incentive to disclose their 
beliefs about future events.  Unlike marketing research, polling, 
or other information gathering techniques, information market 
participants have no incentive to lie or conceal their beliefs.  
Additionally, individual positions in regulated information 
markets cannot be revealed. This means that market 
participants need not fear potential negative consequences of 
making their beliefs known—a fear that cannot necessarily be 
allayed in other types of group information gathering methods. 
For some market participants, rational trading will also 
mean manipulation of the markets in an effort to increase the 
financial stake in their particular market positions.116  For this 
reason, there is a clear need for market regulation, particularly 
anti-manipulation provisions.  Anti-manipulation techniques 
take the form of financial disclosures to regulators and the 
markets themselves, as well as position and capital limits.117  An 
information market, if regulated by the CFTC or SEC, would be 
subject to anti-manipulation provisions, which makes regulated 
markets more desirable than unregulated markets. 
It should be equally clear that these types of markets are 
limited in how much information can be learned.  For instance, a 
certain market may be able to accurately predict who will next be 
elected President, but does not have the capability to discern 
whether a particular policy assurance by a candidate is desired 
by the public.118  This, of course, underpins one of the tenants of 
economics: that missing markets lead to inefficiency.119 
The classic example of this theory was first analyzed fifty 
years ago by Nobel Prize winning economist Ronald Coase.120  
Imagine, for example, that a candy maker operates noisy 
 
 115 Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and 
Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1023 (2005). 
 116 Id. at 1036. 
 117 Id. at 1048. 
 118 One could argue that a candidate’s policy assurances are the reason that he or she 
is likely to be elected, but there is a difference between whether someone is likely to be 
elected, and whether the public agrees with a particular campaign promise. 
 119 See, e.g., Tibor Scitovsky, Two Concepts of External Economies, 62 J. POL. ECON. 
143, 144–50 (1954). 
 120 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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equipment next door to a doctor’s office.  The candy maker, by 
pursuing his own interests, is interfering with the doctor’s 
examination of patients.  While the candy maker derives benefits 
from his operation, the doctor surely suffers.  Economists call this 
type of interference a negative externality, or as Coase put it, a 
social cost.121  An unbiased observer may decide that the candy 
maker should merely shut down his business in order for the 
doctor to serve the welfare of the public.  This overlooks the 
damage that such a solution would cause to the candy maker.  
The same is true, of course, were the onlooker to decide that the 
doctor should shut down his practice.  Thus, there appears to be 
an impasse, or more precisely, an inefficiency given the fact that 
both individuals cannot operate their businesses side-by-side. 
This dilemma can be solved, however, by the creation of a 
market.  In such a market, the candy maker and doctor would 
determine how much money one would need to compensate the 
other with in order to close down their respective businesses.  
The eventual solution depends on the relative size of the gains 
and losses of the parties.  Coase’s example demonstrates that 
inefficiencies are caused by a lack of markets.122  The take away, 
though, is that information markets have the potential to be very 
valuable resources, but enough markets must exist (or be allowed 
to exist) in order for significant amounts of information to be 
learned.123  Although a single information market is inevitably an 
imperfect information discovery vehicle, there seems to be some 
consensus that contracts traded on these types of markets 
provide capable—if not highly accurate—predictive tools.124 
B. Existing Event Based Markets 
The Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) is an electronic trading 
facility operated by the University of Iowa Henry B. Tippie 
College of Business that functions as an experimental and 
academic program, and is one of the better known real-money 
information markets currently in operation.125  The IEM has 
been in existence since 1988, and operates in part pursuant to a 
1993 no-action letter issued by the CFTC, which allowed the IEM 
to list various event contracts subject to certain conditions and 
 
 121 Id. at 2. 
 122 Id. at 3–4. 
 123 Sunstein, supra note 115, at 962. 
 124 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative 
Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 950 (2004). 
 125 About IEM, UNIV. OF IOWA TIPPIE COLLEGE OF BUSINESS, http://tippie.uiowa.edu/ 
iem/about/index.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2010). 
Do Not Delete 3/16/2011 5:16 PM 
434 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 14:415 
limitations.126  The IEM continues to be recognized for its 
presidential and congressional election contracts.127  Currently, 
the IEM offers markets for 2010 Senate and House of 
Representatives “control,” as well as a Federal Reserve monetary 
policy market.128 
In 2008, the IEM offered vote share and winner-take-all 
contracts for the U.S. presidential election cycle.129  The vote 
share contract was associated with the candidates nominated by 
each party, with each contract having a maximum value of one 
dollar, and a contract payout “directly based on the percentage of 
the popular vote received by each of the two major party 
candidates.”130  For instance, a contract for a candidate who 
received twenty-five percent of the popular votes cast for both 
candidates was worth twenty-five cents at settlement.131  The 
winner-take-all contract, in contrast, had a value of either one 
dollar or nothing at settlement.132  These contracts were also 
associated with a specific candidate, but “instead of having a 
payout tied to a particular percentage of the popular vote 
received by each candidate,” the contract “distributed a fixed 
payout of $1 to its holder only if the referenced candidate 
receive[d] a greater percentage of the popular vote cast.”133 
Another well-known event based market is the Hollywood 
Stock Exchange (HSX) which markets itself as the “world’s 
leading entertainment stock market.”134  The HSX, which was 
founded in 1996, is now a subsidiary of Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P.—
a financial services provider that offers clients financial products 
 
 126 Letter from Andrea M. Corcoran, Director, CFTC Division of Trading and 
Markets, to George R. Neumann, Professor of Economics, University of Iowa (June 18, 
1993), available at http://www.cftc.gov/files/foia/repfoia/foirf0503b004.pdf.  This no-action 
letter superseded a more limited letter issued to the IEM in 1992, and extends the CFTC’s 
no-action relief to contracts based on political elections, economic indicators, and certain 
currency exchange rates. Id.  The letter requires that the IEM limit access to any one 
submarket to between 1,000 and 2,000 traders. Id.  The letter also sets the maximum 
amount that any single participant can risk in any one submarket at $500.  The letter 
makes clear that relief is premised on, among other factors, the IEM’s representation that 
the market is being operated for academic purposes, and the assurance that the IEM will 
not receive any profit or other form of compensation from its activities. Id. 
 127 Current Markets, UNIV. OF IOWA TIPPIE COLLEGE OF BUSINESS, 
http://tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/markets/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2010). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 
supra note 106. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 About HSX, HSX, http://www.HSX.com/about/?page=index (last visited Sept. 27, 
2010). 
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and services in the equity and fixed income capital markets.135  
The HSX allows individuals to buy and sell virtual shares of 
celebrities and movies with a currency called the Hollywood 
Dollar.136  The HSX is less of an information market than the 
IEM because participants are not using real money,137 but it 
nonetheless provides a realistic framework for other—more 
authentic—information markets.  Despite the faux nature of the 
HSX, it has proved to be a relatively accurate predictor of box 
office success or failure.138  As one recent commentator noted, the 
“HSX offers good predictions of a film’s gross receipts before 
release and, relatively speaking, even better predictions after 
opening weekend—when a large number of traders have some 
information in the form of (or at least the possibility of) observing 
the finished film on screen, along with audience reactions.”139  By 
not allowing participants to conduct real trading operations, the 
HSX avoids securities and derivatives regulation, while still 
allowing individuals to predict the success of films.140 
While many individuals are interested in politics or Federal 
Reserve monetary policy, there are some who are undoubtedly 
more engrossed in the success or failure of major motion pictures.  
This, of course, was the thinking when Cantor Futures 
Exchange, L.P.—another subsidiary of Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P.—
and Media Derivatives, Inc. applied for designation as contract 
markets in which individuals would be able to trade real 
domestic box office receipt derivatives.141 
C. The Purpose of DBOR Derivative Exchanges 
Supporters of domestic box office receipt (DBOR) derivative 
exchanges claim that such markets will assist the motion picture 
industry by expanding the number of potential financing sources 
 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 This statement is based on the assumption that individuals will behave more 
rationally when their own money is at stake.  Thus, an individual is less likely to merely 
guess or enter into riskier contracts which, while providing the potential for a larger 
payoff, are also less likely to actually payoff. See Emile Servan-Schreiber et al., Prediction 
Markets: Does Money Matter?, 14 ELECTRONIC MARKETS 243, 250 (2004), available at 
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Papers/DoesMoneyMatter.pdf (finding no 
difference in the predictive accuracy between real money and play money exchanges 
during the 2003 NFL football season). 
 138 Saul Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of Regulation: Lessons from 
the Iowa Electronic Markets and the Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. CORP. L. 589, 593 
(2003). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 592–93. 
 141 See infra note 159. 
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available, as well as allowing film companies and investors to 
limit their risk.142 
Historically, film companies raised financing through public 
or private sources, but the number of equity investors has 
decreased dramatically over the past thirty years.143  One of the 
reasons for this decrease in capital is the risk involved in making 
a motion picture.  Even though there are anywhere between 600 
and 700 films produced each year, only about 200 of these obtain 
a release that could potentially lead to any sort of return, let 
alone a profit.144  When a blockbuster does occur, though, it can 
make up for the losses on these other films.145  Unfortunately, 
significant capital is required to make enough films to ensure 
that at least one studio film will be a blockbuster. 
The most common film financing technique is known as a 
banking pre-sale.146  This approach involves the assembly of a 
package involving a script, director, and key cast members.147  
Once the film package is complete, the producer engages an 
agent to pre-sell the film throughout the world at various film 
markets.148  However, “[m]any films do not make it past the film 
markets.”149  Pre-selling films has become more difficult, though, 
and distributors are now waiting until films are in production 
before committing to license them.150  For those films that are 
financed, very few are done on an individual basis.151  Film 
financiers generally engage in “slate financing,” whereby an 
investor finances a portfolio of future films, thus spreading 
around—and decreasing—the risk that an investor’s capital will 
be lost.152  With slate financing, however, the investor does not 
 
 142 See Nikki Finke, Worst Idea Ever? Wall Street Plans Futures Exchange Tied to Box 
Office, DEADLINE N.Y. (Dec. 9, 2008, 11:23 AM), http://www.deadline.com/2008/12/wall-
stree-firm-planning-futures-exchange-tied-to-movie-sales/ (quoting a financial source 
explaining that such exchanges “could lead to another source of revenue for studios who 
can make their own bets on movies they are releasing to increase total revenue take or 
hedge losses”). 
 143 Schuyler M. Moore, Raising Film Financing by Betting the Box, 24 ENTM’T L. REP. 
4, 4 (2003) [hereinafter Moore, Raising Film Financing]. 
 144 See Schuyler M. Moore, Financing Drama, L.A. LAW., May 2008, at 2 [hereinafter 
Moore, Financing Drama] (“Many events may cause films to lose money, such as budget 
overages, third-party claims, misappropriation and, of course, artistic failure.”). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 4. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id.  
 150 Moore, Financing Drama, supra note 144, at 4 (“Average worldwide presales have 
shrunk from about 100 percent of a film’s budget in the heyday of the financing technique 
to less than 70 percent today.”). 
 151 Id. at 4–6. 
 152 See Norbert Morawetz, Finance, Policy and Industrial Dynamics The Rise of 
Coproductions in the Film Industry, at n.xi (June 18–20, 2007), http://www2.druid.dk/ 
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always know what films are being financed, and thus, the 
investor is essentially investing blind.153 
Anyone who invests in a film project presumably does so 
with the expectation that the film (or slate of films) will provide a 
positive net return.  Clearly, film financiers have an incentive to 
reduce their financial risk, which allows these individuals or 
companies to survive if a film flops.  One of the most common 
ways to reduce risk is for film companies to enter into split-rights 
transactions, whereby two or more companies co-finance a film 
with one taking domestic rights, and the other taking foreign 
rights.154  The downside to this type of contract is that when 
companies enter into contracts where profits are shared over two 
territories, the valuable distribution rights, and about half the 
profits, are given away to competitors.  Nonetheless, this 
approach has become widespread despite the fact that film 
companies are in the business of owning and exploiting film 
rights.155 
Film financing and hedging obviously go hand in hand.  An 
individual or organization is more likely to invest in a film if 
assurances can be made that there will be a limit to the potential 
financial losses, while still providing for potential financial gains.  
The purpose of DBOR derivative markets, therefore, is to allow 
the parties with financial interests in a film’s revenue stream to 
hedge against the risks associated with producing, distributing, 
financing, and insuring motion pictures.156  The individuals and 
organizations potentially included in this group include: 
(1) owners of screenplays; (2) debt and equity investors in a 
particular film or slate of films; (3) film talent who either benefit 
directly from box office receipts or whose future career prospects 
depend on appearance in quality films; (4) studios who need a 
steady revenue stream to continue production if movie 
investment dries up; (5) insurers of film talent and movies; 
(6) theaters whose revenue stream depends on people purchasing 
tickets to see a film; (7) film distributors; and (8) promotional 
 
conferences/viewpaper.php?id=1671&cf=9 (explaining that, “[r]ather than relying on a 
single top-or-flop project, equity funds and studios use a portfolio approach to film 
financing where risk is spread across a slate of films”) (citation omitted). 
 153 Cyrus Sanati, Movie Time at the C.F.T.C. Draws Heated Debate, N.Y. TIMES BLOG 
(May 19, 2010, 4:04 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/19/heated-debate-
during-movie-time-at-the-c-f-t-c/. 
 154 Moore, Raising Film Financing, supra note 144, at 4. 
 155 Id. 
 156 See, e.g., Randall Dodd, Derivatives Study Ctr., Derivatives Markets: Sources of 
Vulnerability in U.S. Financial Markets, at 2 (Nov. 15, 2001), 
http://www.financialpolicy.org/fpfspr8.pdf (explaining that derivatives, in general, are 
used to “hedge the risks normally associated with commerce and finance”). 
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marketing partners (e.g., fast food chains) who produce or sell 
products associated with particular films. 
It should be noted that these individuals or organizations 
could potentially benefit from an exchange.  This is not to say 
that these markets will actually be used by these individuals or 
organizations.  Nonetheless, as stated earlier, when seeking the 
source of inefficiencies, one should look for missing markets, and 
allow potential participants to decide whether these products and 
markets are right for them.157 
D. History of DBOR Derivative Exchanges 
In 2008, Cantor Futures Exchange, L.P. (Cantor) and Media 
Derivatives, Inc. (MDEX)158 applied for designation as contract 
markets in which individuals and organizations would be able to 
trade DBOR derivative contracts.159  The process of creating an 
exchange on which derivatives are traded can be broken down 
into two main parts: (1) designation of the exchange as a contract 
(or other type) of market, and (2) approval of the contracts 
proposed for trading on the exchange. 
1.  CFTC Approval of DBOR Markets 
When the CEA was amended in 2000 by the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act (CFMA), a three-tiered market 
framework was created.160  Since the enactment of the Grain 
Futures Act in 1922, the CFTC, or its precursor agencies, have 
regulated exchanges known as designated contract markets 
 
 157 At a May 19, 2010 hearing before the CFTC, Clark Hallren and Alice Neuhauser 
stated that they are not aware of any OTC derivative market where the contracts are 
linked to box office receipts.  Opponents of DBOR derivatives would suggest that the lack 
of an OTC market tends to indicate that no one would use a DBOR exchange.  The flip 
side of this argument is that the lack of an OTC market could mean that a potential party 
is merely unable to find a counterparty for its desired contract.  Additionally, one benefit 
that an exchange has over an OTC market is that exchanges and regulators are required 
to keep individual positions confidential.  During this same hearing, CFTC Commissioner 
Gary Gensler acknowledged that about seventy percent of all contracts submitted to the 
CFTC for trading approval fail due to lack of trading volume. See Live Blogging! The 
CFTC Public Meeting on Movie Box Office Futures, JABCAT ON MOVIES (May 19, 2010), 
http://jabcatmovies.com/2010/05/live-blogging-the-cftc-public-meeting-on-movie-box-office-
futures. 
 158 In correspondence with the CFTC dated May 20, 2010, MDEX changed its name to 
Trend Exchange, Inc.  This article, however, will continue to refer to this entity as MDEX. 
 159 See Application for DCO Registration of Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. (Nov. 25, 2008), 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/cantordcoapplicationlett
er.pdf; Media Derivatives, Inc. Background Paper (August 2009), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/ 
groups/public/@rulesandproducts/documents/ifdocs/mdex092509b.pdf. 
 160 See supra note 66. 
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(DCMs).161  DCMs “may list for trading futures or option 
contracts based on any underlying commodity, index or 
instrument.”162  However, in addition to DCMs, the CFMA 
created less regulated organized markets known as derivatives 
transaction execution facilities (DTEF).163  The CFMA also 
authorized the creation of “exempt boards of trade”164 (exempt 
boards) and “excluded electronic trading facilities” (EETF).165  
The exempt board and EETF provisions of the CFMA provided a 
means for establishing trading facilities for certain derivative 
transactions (e.g., energy, metal, chemical, and emissions 
futures) that remain largely outside the scope of the CFTC’s 
regulatory authority, with the exception that exempt boards 
remain subject to the anti-fraud and anti-manipulations 
prohibitions of the CEA.166  EETFs, however, are not subject to 
these prohibitions.167 
DCMs remain subject to strict regulatory requirements by 
the CFTC.168  Specifically, the CFMA amended the CEA to 
require entities requesting a contract market designation to 
demonstrate that it meets eight designation criteria,169 and 
 
 161 History of the Current Regulatory Framework, STA UNIV., 
http://www.stauniversity.org/content/History%20of%20the%20Current%20Regulatory%20
Framework%20-%20Futures%20Regulation.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
 162 Designated Contract Markets, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, 
http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/DCMs/index.htm (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2010). 
 163 Susan C. Ervin Dechert, CFTC Regulation of Energy Derivatives: An Overview 
(Aug. 13, 2002), http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/clearinghouse/ 
02annual/37/ervin.pdf. 
 164 7 U.S.C. § 7a-3(b) (2000).  Transactions conducted on an exempt board must be 
between eligible contract participants.  Permissible transactions for an exempt board of 
trade are limited to transactions “for which the underlying commodity has: (A) a nearly 
inexhaustible deliverable supply; (B) a deliverable supply that is sufficiently large, and a 
cash market sufficiently liquid, to render any contract traded on the commodity highly 
unlikely to be susceptible to the threat of manipulation; or (C) no cash market.” Id.  
Transactions on an exempt board are subject to the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation 
provisions of the CEA. See § 7a-3(c). 
 165 § 2(d)(2).  The CEA does not apply to contracts (i) entered into only by eligible 
contract participants trading on a principal-to-principal basis or in certain investment 
management or fiduciary capacities, and (ii) done so on an electronic trading facility. See 
id. 
 166 Congress Makes Changes to the Regulation of Futures and Derivatives 
Transactions, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Jan. 2001), http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/ 
fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/EAB1D60E-C2CE-47DC-BEB4-
2D6B543759878.cfm. 
 167 Id. 
 168 See § 7(d). 
 169 § 7(b).  The eight designation criteria are: (1) general demonstration of adherence 
to designation criteria; (2) prevention of market manipulation; (3) fair and equitable 
trading; (4) enforcement of rules on the trade execution facility; (5) financial integrity of 
transactions; (6) disciplinary procedures; (7) public access to information on the contract 
market; and (8) ability of the contract market to obtain information. Id. 
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complies with eighteen core principles.170  The CEA requires that 
the CFTC approve or deny a designation application within 180 
days of the filing of the application.171  If the CFTC denies the 
application, it must specify the grounds for the denial.172  
Following a refusal to designate an applicant as a contract 
market, the CFTC must provide the applicant with an 
opportunity for a hearing on the record before the CFTC.173  A 
DCM applicant thereafter has a right to appeal an adverse 
decision directly to a federal appeals court.174  Despite 
designating over fifty DCMs over the years, as of December 2010, 
the CFTC oversaw only seventeen DCMs where trading was 
active or anticipated.175 
In addition to amending the requirements for achieving a 
contract market designation, the CFMA created less regulated 
DTEFs.  DTEFs are subject to a less comprehensive body of core 
principles than contract markets,176 but in exchange for this less 
stringent regulatory oversight, are limited in the types of 
contracts it can offer and the types of parties who are allowed to 
participate in the transactions.177  There are currently no DTEFs 
regulated by the CFTC.178 
 
 170 § 7(d)(1)–(18).  The eighteen core principles contract markets are subject to 
include: (1) general adherence to these core principles; (2) compliance with the rules; 
(3) listing of products not subject to manipulation; (4) monitoring of trading; (5) position 
limits; (6) emergency authority; (7) disclosure of information; (8) trading data 
dissemination; (9) execution of transactions; (10) trade information maintenance; 
(11) financial integrity; (12) protection of market participants; (13) dispute resolution; 
(14) fitness standards; (15) conflicts of interest; (16) governance of mutually owned 
markets; (17) recordkeeping; and (18) antitrust considerations. Id. 
 171 § 8(a).  The CEA also contains a provision for staying the running of the 180-day 
time limit when an exchange is notified that the application for contract market 
designation is materially incomplete, and provides the Commission with at least sixty 
days for review once the application has been resubmitted in completed form. Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (Supp. II 1965). 
 175 Trading Organizations, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, 
http://services.cftc.gov/SIRT/SIRT.aspx?Topic=TradingOrganizations&implicit=true&type
=DCM&CustomColumnDisplay=TTTTTTTT (last visited Dec. 1, 2010) [hereinafter 
Trading Organizations]. 
 176 § 7a(d)(2)–(9).  The eight core principles for DTEFs are subject to include: 
(1) compliance with rules; (2) monitoring of trading; (3) disclosure of information; (4) daily 
publication of trading information; (5) fitness standards; (6) conflicts of interest; 
(7) recordkeeping; and (8) antitrust considerations. Id. 
 177 See § 7a(b).  If access to a DTEF is limited to eligible commercial entities trading 
for their own accounts, the DTEF may permit trading involving any commodity other 
than an agricultural commodity, and if access to a DTEF is not so limited, transactions 
are restricted to contracts where: 
(A) the underlying commodity has a nearly inexhaustible deliverable supply; 
(B) the underlying commodity has a deliverable supply that is sufficiently large 
that the contract is highly unlikely to be susceptible to the threat of 
manipulation; (C) the underlying commodity has no cash market; (D)(i) the 
contract is a security futures product and (ii) the [DTEF] is [also registered as 
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EETFs and exempt boards, as stated above, were largely 
exempted from the CFTC’s regulatory authority by the CFMA, 
and therefore these entities need not comply with any 
designation criteria or core principles. 
On April 16, 2010 and April 20, 2010, respectively, the CFTC 
approved MDEX and Cantor’s applications for registration as 
DCMs.179  The CFTC noted that MDEX and Cantor’s applications 
did not include any proposed DBOR derivative contracts to be 
traded on the exchanges, but rather, the approval was based on 
the proposed general operations of the exchanges.180  Further, the 
CFTC observed that the general operations of the exchanges may 
not be appropriate for all types of DBOR contracts, because 
certain contracts may require special surveillance or compliance 
measures.181  For this reason, the CFTC ordered MDEX and 
Cantor to not only ensure the appropriateness of particular 
products for trading on the exchanges, but also required the two 
exchanges to submit to the CFTC any contracts that the two 
exchanges anticipate listing on the exchanges for prior 
approval.182 
By requiring prior approval of DBOR contracts, the CFTC 
impeded MDEX and Cantor from conducting any business.  As 
stated previously, registration as a DCM is only half of an 
exchange’s battle.  Without products to list, a DCM is analogous 
to a doctor without patients. 
 
a national securities exchange] . . .; [or] (E) the [CFTC] determines, based on 
the market characteristics, surveillance history, self-regulatory record and 
capacity of the facility that trading in the contract (or option) is highly unlikely 
to be susceptible to the threat of manipulation . . . . 
Id. 
 178 Trading Organizations, supra note 175. 
 179 Order of Designation as a Contract Market by the U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n at 2, In re Request of Media Derivatives, Inc. (Apr. 16, 2010) 
[hereinafter MDEX Order of Designation as a Contract Market], available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/mdexorder041510.pdf; 
Order of Designation as a Contract Market by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n at 1, In re Request of Cantor Futures Exchange, L.P., (Apr. 20, 2010) [hereinafter 
Cantor Order of Designation as a Contract Market], available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/cantorfuturesexchan
georder.pdf. 
 180 MDEX Order of Designation as a Contract Market, supra note 179, at 2; Cantor 
Order of Designation as a Contract Market, supra note 179, at 3–4. 
 181 Application for Contract Market Designation Compliance with Designation 
Criteria and Core Principles, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@requestsandactions/documents/ifdocs/cantordcmc
ompliancechart.pdf. 
 182 MDEX Order of Designation as a Contract Market, supra note 179, at 2; Cantor 
Order of Designation as a Contract Market, supra note 179, at 4. 
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2.  CFTC Approval of DBOR Products 
Even before the CFTC designated MDEX and Cantor as 
contract markets, both exchanges submitted proposed contracts 
for listing on their respective exchanges.183  On March 9, 2010, 
MDEX requested prior CFTC approval to list an opening 
weekend DBOR futures and binary option184 contract on the 
motion picture Takers.185  On March 30, 2010, Cantor requested 
approval to trade derivatives contracts on its DCM for the motion 
picture The Expendables.186 
In addition to creating a three-tiered framework for 
derivative markets, the CFMA also amended the CEA’s listing 
requirements by now allowing exchanges to choose between 
listing contracts pursuant to a self-certification procedure, or 
pursuant to a prior review procedure by the CFTC.187  By filing a 
self-certification, an exchange certifies that the contract complies 
with the CEA, and is required to submit the certification 
documents to the CFTC no later than one business day before 
initial implementation of the product listing.188  The CFMA made 
it possible, therefore, for trading to occur on contracts that are 
subsequently banned by the CFTC, merely by self-certifying the 
contract in good faith.  On the other hand, if prior approval of a 
contract is sought, the exchange must submit to the CFTC the 
contract’s terms and conditions, and demonstrate compliance 
with CFTC regulations.189  Products submitted for prior approval 
are subject to a forty-five day review period, with the potential 
for a forty-five day extension if the product raises a “novel or 
complex” issue.190 
 
 183 MDEX Order of Designation as a Contract Market, supra note 179, at 1; Cantor 
Order of Designation as a Contract Market, supra note 179, at 1. 
 184 A binary option “is a type of options trading where the payoff is either some fixed 
amount of some asset or nothing at all.” Binary Options Trading, 1 ANYOPTION, 
http://www.1anyoption.com/tag/binary-option-trading/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).  Thus, 
options that are binary in nature allow for only two possible outcomes.  For example, an 
individual purchases a binary call option on XYZ, Inc.’s stock with a strike price of $75 
and a binary payoff of $500.  If, on or before the maturity date, the stock trades at $75 or 
above, the purchaser of the option receives $500.  If the stock expires before reaching $75 
or more, the purchaser receives nothing and is out the option premium. 
 185 See Statement of the Commission, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, 
June 14, 2010 [hereinafter Statement of the Commission], available at http://www.cftc.gov/ 
ucm/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/mdexcommissionstatement061410.pdf. 
 186 See Request by Cantor Exchange For Review and Approval of the The Expendables 
Futures Contract, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, June 28, 2010, available 
at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/ 
cantorfuturesdbororder062810.pdf. 
 187 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c) (2000). 
 188 See 17 C.F.R. § 40.6 (2009). 
 189 17 C.F.R. § 40 app. A. 
 190 17 C.F.R. § 40.3. 
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Given the relatively novel nature of these contracts, the 
CFTC required MDEX and Cantor to submit proposed contracts 
to the CFTC for prior approval before trading.191  On May 19, 
2010, the Commission held a public hearing to consider issues 
related to the trading of DBOR futures and binary options.192  As 
the Commission noted during this meeting, the CEA provides 
that the CFTC must approve a contract submitted for prior 
approval within ninety days, unless it finds that the contract 
violates the CEA.193  As stated earlier, the CEA grants the CFTC 
jurisdiction over contracts for the sale of a commodity for future 
delivery and over commodity option contracts traded on DCMs, 
and therefore, the CFTC, in reviewing MDEX and Cantor’s 
applications for prior approval of their DBOR contracts, was 
required to determine whether the underlying subject of these 
contracts was a commodity.194 
i.  CFTC’s Finding that DBORs are Commodities 
The CFMA separated the universe of commodities into three 
categories: (1) agricultural commodities; (2) exempt commodities; 
and (3) excluded commodities.195  In the order approving MDEX’s 
DBOR contract, the CFTC noted that “[m]ovie revenues fall into 
the same category as many other commodities for which futures 
and options contracts have been either approved by or self-
certified to the Commission where the underlying commodity is a 
non-price-based measure of an economic activity, commercial 
 
 191 Dan M. Berkovitz, General Counsel, Commodity Futures Trading Comm., 
Remarks at Public Meeting to Consider the Trading of Contracts Based on Motion Picture 
Box Office Receipts and Gather Views of Interested Parties (May 19, 2010) [hereinafter 
Berkovitz Remarks], available at www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/ 
title/trasncripts051910. 
 192 For an archived webcast of this meeting, see Consideration of the Trading of 
Contracts Based on Motion Picture Box Office Receipts, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES 
TRADING COMM’N, http://capitolconnection.net/capcon/cftc/webcastarchive.htm# (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2010). 
 193 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a-2(c)(3) (West 2009) (requiring the CFTC to “approve any such new 
contract or instrument . . . unless the Commission finds that the new contract or 
instrument . . . would violate this chapter”);; 17 C.F.R. § 40.3(b)–(c) (“All products 
submitted for Commission approval . . . shall be deemed approved . . . forty-five days after 
receipt . . . .  The Commission may extend the forty-five day review period . . . for: (1) [a]n 
additional forty-five days, if the product raises novel or complex issues . . . .”);; 17 C.F.R. 
§ 40.3(d) (“The Commission . . . may notify the submitting entity that it will not, or is 
unable to, approve the product or instrument.”). 
 194 Statement of the Commission, supra note 185, at 2 n.3 (“In the great majority of 
new product reviews, the answer to this question is obvious and requires no explicit 
analysis.  However, such a determination was made prior to Commission approval of the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s single-name Credit Event contracts.”). 
 195 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 5660, 106th Cong. (2d sess. 
2000); Jayashree B. Gokhale, Hedge to Arrive Contracts: Futures of Forwards, 53 DRAKE 
L. REV. 55, 56 n.3 (2004). 
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activity or environmental event.”196  The Commission has found 
that such a commodity is a right or interest within the meaning 
of section 1(a)(4) of the CEA:197 “While the right or interest may 
be intangible, it can clearly serve as the basis for a futures or 
options contract.”198 
The Commission’s order did not explicitly say which of the 
three categories of commodities DBORs fall under, but the 
language of the order makes it apparent that box office receipts 
fall under the category of excluded commodities.199  The CEA 
defines an excluded commodity as “an occurrence . . . associated 
with a financial, commercial, or economic consequence.”200  
Despite the fact that the CFTC had never previously dealt with 
DBOR derivative contracts, the Commission’s order 
acknowledged that more than five hundred similarly excluded 
commodity contracts were submitted to the CFTC for prior 
approval or self-certified since the CFMA was enacted.201 
ii.  DBOR Contracts Do Not Appear to be Subject to 
Manipulation 
Having passed the threshold issue of whether DBORs are 
commodities, the CFTC addressed the issue of whether these 
DBOR derivative contracts satisfied the core principles 
established by the CFMA. 
Under the third core principle of the CEA, in order to 
maintain its standing, a DCM is required to list “only contracts 
that are not readily susceptible to manipulation.”202  Unlike state 
and federal securities laws, U.S. derivative regulations do not 
make insider trading unlawful.  Nonetheless, prior to approving 
MDEX’s contracts, the Commission insisted that modifications be 
made to the contract proposal to ensure that knowledgeable 
parties cannot intentionally release or misreport data that would 
have an impact on the trading or settlement of this contract.203 
Because DBOR contracts are cash-settled (as opposed to 
physically delivered), the Commission must be sure that the 
settlement price upon which these contracts are based is not 
subject to manipulation.  The vast majority of DBOR numbers 
 
 196 Statement of the Commission, supra note 185, at 3. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. at 4. 
 200 7 U.S.C. § 1a(13)(iv) (2000). 
 201 Statement of the Commission, supra note 185, at 3 (“More than 500 of these types 
of contracts have been approved by or self-certified to the Commission to date.”). 
 202 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(3) (2000). 
 203 Statement of the Commission, supra note 185, at 4–5. 
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are reported by Rentrak Corporation (Rentrak) and disseminated 
throughout the film industry.204  Rentrak is a third-party data 
aggregator and does not have a direct monetary interest in any 
motion picture.205  Essentially, Rentrak transfers box office 
revenue numbers from movie theaters to distributors.206  These 
numbers are used mostly by film studios as marketing tools 
(e.g., advertising a film as the number one grossing movie at the 
box office).  Since 2008, Rentrak has collected more than ninety-
eight percent of all box office revenue numbers, with the 
remaining box office numbers being delivered directly from 
theaters to distributors.207  Because the majority of data is 
automated, there is little opportunity for “misrepresentation or 
distortion of the numbers reported to Rentrak by the theaters.”208  
The Commission found that the price basis for DBOR contracts 
(i.e., Rentrak’s numbers) are quite similar to other commodity 
pricing data (e.g., energy contracts that rely on data from 
commercial index providers and agricultural contracts that rely 
on data provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture), and 
therefore, do not appear susceptible to manipulation.209 
iii.  DBOR Contracts Provide a Reasonable Hedging 
Device 
Although repealed by the CFMA, the CEA used to require 
CFTC staff to apply an economic purpose test when evaluating 
proposed DCM contracts.210  Specifically, the economic purpose 
test only allowed trading of contracts that would “not be contrary 
to the public interest.”211  The CFTC, in interpreting this section, 
found that a contract that was not contrary to the public interest 
must serve a legitimate hedging purpose.212 
 
 204 Id. at 5. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. at 5–6 (known as “call around” data). 
 208 Id. at 6. 
 209 Id. at 6–7.  
 210 See id. at 9. 
 211 7 U.S.C. § 7(g) (1974) (“When such board of trade demonstrates that transactions 
for future delivery in the commodity for which designation as a contract market is sought 
will not be contrary to the public interest.”). 
 212 Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 
supra note 106, at 25672 (“The public interest test . . . included an ‘economic purpose’ test, 
subject to a final test of the public interest.  The economic purpose test . . . was used to 
prohibit the trading of certain contracts.  Notably, the economic purpose test regarding 
contracts appropriate for trading on a futures exchange was not necessarily congruent 
with the scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction.  Accordingly, while futures contracts that 
failed the economic purpose test were prohibited from trading on futures exchanges and 
thus illegal because of the on-exchange trading requirement, they (and any instrument 
with identical terms) remained futures contracts, fully subject to the Commission’s 
jurisdiction.”). 
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Despite the repeal of the economic purpose test, the findings 
and purpose section of the CEA, as amended by the CFMA, finds 
that transactions subject to the CEA have a significant impact on 
the public interest because they provide a “means for managing 
and assuming price risks.”213  The CFTC recognized in its order 
that some commentators have suggested that the findings and 
purpose section of the CEA reestablishes an economic purpose 
test.214  Nonetheless, because the economic purpose test was 
repealed by the CFMA, the Commission declined to adopt the 
test in determining whether to approve DBOR derivative 
contracts.215 
Despite declining to apply the pre-CFMA economic purpose 
test, the CFTC did evaluate whether MDEX’s DBOR contracts 
would provide some reasonable means for managing risks 
associated with box office revenues.216  In conducting its analysis, 
the Commission assessed the risks faced by individuals 
associated with box office revenues.217  The Commission noted 
that “[f]ilm production requires a significant amount of upfront 
capital with long lead times to completion.  In addition, film 
financing can involve pre-selling in the form of office space leases 
for construction and transactions with foreign distributors or 
television providers.”218  In order to deal with these risks, film 
studios have been required to rely on third party financial 
investors.219  In light of public comments and written testimony 
submitted to the CFTC, the Commission believed that third 
party investors would potentially utilize DBOR futures to 
mitigate their commercial exposure.220  The Commission also 
agreed with the authors of many public comment letters who 
stated that DBOR contracts “would provide a risk management 
 
 213 7 U.S.C. § 5(a) (2000) (“The transactions subject to this chapter are entered into 
regularly in interstate and international commerce and are affected with a national public 
interest by providing a means for managing and assuming price risks, discovering prices, 
or disseminating pricing information through trading in liquid, fair and financially secure 
trading facilities.”). 
 214 Statement of the Commission, supra note 185, at 9.  At the May 19th hearing on 
DBOR derivatives, CFTC General Counsel, Dan Berkovitz, stated that:  
[I]n 2000 . . . [Congress] . . . took out the public interest test, but . . . we believe 
that within the findings and purposes [section of the CEA] together with the 
requirement that the Commission find that and not be violative of the Act that 
there still is authority within the statute for the Commission . . . [to reject a 
contract] . . . in a circumstance where the Commission would believe that the 
contract would violate the finding and the purpose of the Act . . . . 
Berkovtiz Remarks, supra note 191, at 78–79. 
 215 Statement of the Commission, supra note 185, at 9–10. 
 216 Id. at 10. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. at 10–11. 
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tool or expressed interest in using the contracts for hedging.”221  
Those authors “stated that direct participants in the motion 
picture industry, such as studios and producers, may benefit 
from having motion picture revenue futures contracts.”222 
In light of the Commission hearing on DBOR contracts and 
the public comments submitted to the CFTC, the Commission 
approved MDEX’s DBOR contract on the movie Takers for 
trading on its DCM on June 14, 2010, and Cantor’s DBOR 
contract on the movie The Expendables on June 28, 2010.223  
Approval by the CFTC on MDEX’s contracts, however, was short 
lived.224  Once the Financial Reform Act was signed into law by 
the President, trading of DBOR derivatives became a banned 
activity.225 
E. Ban on DBOR Exchange Products 
As stated earlier, the Financial Reform Act was passed in 
response to the financial collapse of 2008, and imposed sweeping 
changes to the U.S. financial regulatory system, including the 
regulation of derivatives.226  Among these changes was the joint 
regulation of the previously unregulated OTC swap market by 
the SEC and CFTC.227 
The Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act 
(WSTA), in addition to increasing regulation over swaps, banned 
trading of box office derivatives.228  Specifically, the Act amended 
the definition of a commodity in the CEA to include an 
enumerated list of agricultural commodities 
and all other goods and articles, except onions . . . and motion picture 
box office receipts (or any index, measure, value, or data related to 
such receipts), and all services, rights, and interests (except motion 
 
 221 Id. at 11. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. at 11–12 (approving MDEX’s product request); Statement of the Commission, 
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, June 28, 2010, at 1, available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/dborcommissionstateme
nt0622810.pdf (approving Cantor’s futures contract on The Expendables). 
 224 Paul Harris, House-Senate Committee Bans Futures Trading: MPAA 'Heartened' 
With Decision; Major Blow to Exchange Companies, VARIETY (Jun. 25, 2010, 10:29 AM), 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118021065.html?categoryid=13&cs=1. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Times Topics: Financial Regulatory Reform, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/ 
topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/financial_regulatory_reform/ 
index.html (last updated Jul. 21, 2010). 
 227 Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. 
§§ 712(a)–(b) (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf 
(dividing jurisdiction over security-based swaps with the SEC and all other swaps with 
the CFTC). 
 228 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 721(a)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 1659 (2010). 
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picture box office receipts, or any index, measure, value or data 
related to such receipts) in which contracts for future delivery are 
presently or in the future dealt in.229 
In changing the definition of a commodity, Congress, without 
conducting a hearing on the issue prior to drafting the Financial 
Reform Act,230 banned trading of all DBOR derivatives.231  
Beginning in 1864 with the Anti-Gold Futures Act, Congress has 
occasionally attempted to ban trading of derivatives on specific 
commodities and other underlying instruments.  As of December 
2010, however, DBORs—along with onions—were the only two 
commodities on which Congress deemed it unlawful to trade 
derivative contracts.232 
1.  Previous Bans on Specific Derivative Contracts 
As mentioned previously, Congress’ first attempt at 
derivatives regulation occurred on June 17, 1864, when it passed 
the Anti-Gold Futures Act.233  The Act made it unlawful to enter 
into any futures contract for the purchase of gold coin, gold 
bullion, or foreign exchange.234  The Act had the unintended 
consequence of leading to the further decline in the value of the 
Union’s “fiat currency,” and was repealed a mere two weeks after 
 
 229 7 U.S.C.S. § 1a(4) (LEXIS, through P.L. 111-237). 
 230 On April 22, 2010, the House Agriculture Subcommittee on General Farm 
Commodities and Risk Management held a hearing on DBOR derivatives. See Press 
Release, House Agric. Comm., Subcommittee Reviews Proposed “Movies Futures” Market 
(Apr. 22, 2010), available at http://agriculture.house.gov/list/press/agriculture_dem/ 
PR042210GFCRM.html.  However, the ban on DBOR contracts in the Financial Reform 
Act was originally drafted by the Senate Agriculture and Senate Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs Committees.  The Financial Reform Act passed by the Senate on May 20, 
2010 was required to be reconciled with the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2009, which was passed by the House on December 11, 2009.  The original House 
bill did not include a ban on DBOR derivatives, and the House Agriculture Subcommittee 
hearing on this issue did not take place until after the bill was passed.  House Agriculture 
Committee Chairman, Collin C. Peterson, who did attend the House Agriculture 
Subcommittee on DBOR contracts, as well as House Agriculture Subcommittee on 
General Farm Commodities and Risk Management Chairman Leonard Boswell, were 
members of the joint House-Senate conference committee in charge of reconciling the 
Financial Reform Act.  Reps. Peterson and Boswell, as far as this author can tell, were the 
only individuals on the conference committee who attended the House Agriculture 
Subcommittee hearing. See generally Hearing to Review Proposals to Establish Exchanges 
Trading “Movie Futures”: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on General Farm Commodities 
and Risk Management of the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 111th Cong. (2010); House 
Conferees Appointed on H.R. 4173, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://financialservices.house.gov/FinancialSvcsDemMedia/file/ 
key_issues/Financial_Regulatory_Reform/Conferees_List_Final.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 
2010). 
 231 See Harris, supra note 224. 
 232 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 721(a)(4). 
 233 Greenspan, Government Regulation and Derivative Contracts, supra note 47. 
 234 Anti-Gold Futures Act, ch. 127, 13 Stat. 132, (1864). 
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it was passed.235  It would be nearly a century before Congress 
once again banned trading on a specific commodity future.236  
When Congress passed the CEA in 1936, it imposed an 
absolute ban on options for regulated commodities.237  Until the 
CEA was amended by the CFTCA in 1974, there existed no 
restrictions on the trading of options on unregulated 
commodities.238  On September 21, 1981, however, the CFTC 
adopted a comprehensive set of regulations to govern exchange-
trading of options on futures contracts under a controlled and 
monitored three-year pilot program, and on February 15, 1985, 
the CFTC approved the first option on a physical commodity: 
gold bullion.239  Commodity options, which are now fully 
regulated by the CFTC, can be traded on DCMs if the exchange 
meets the prior approval or self-certification requirements of the 
CEA.240 
Perhaps the most pervasive manipulation of the commodity 
markets between the years of 1930 and 1970 took place in the 
onion markets.241  As a result of the severe price swings in 
onions, the CEA was amended in 1955 to give the Commodity 
Exchange Authority power to regulate trading in onion 
futures.242  In 1956, Congress gave consideration to prohibiting 
trading in onion futures, with hearings being held before the 
House Agriculture Committee, which concluded that there was a 
causal relationship between trading onion futures and 
 
 235 Jenny Wahl, Give Lincoln Credit: How Paying for the Civil War Transformed the 
United States Financial System, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 700, 725 n.109; Greenspan, 
Government Regulation and Derivative Contracts, supra note 47. 
 236 David S. Jacks, Populists Versus Theorists: Future Markets and the Volatility of 
Prices, 44 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 342, 353 (2007) (discussing the passage of the 
Onion Futures Act in 1958). 
 237 Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, sec. 4c(3)(B), 49 Stat. 1491, 1494 (1936). 
 238 3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 
AGE OF DERIVATIVES TO THE MILLENNIUM (1970–2001) 44 (2002). 
 239 History of the CFTC, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N 
http://www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/index.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2010). 
 240 Proposals to Establish Exchanges Trading “Movie Futures:” Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on General Farm Commodities & Risk Mgmt., House Comm. on Agric. 111th Cong. 
6–7 (2010) (testimony of Dan M. Berkovitz, General Counsel, U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission), available at http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/111/no42210/ 
Berkovitz.pdf. 
 241 See, e.g., Vincent W. Kosuga, 19 Agric. Dec. 603, 603 (1960) (highlighting that the 
Commodity Exchange Authority alleged upward manipulation of spot market onion prices 
and onion futures contracts for November and December of 1955 on the CME, and further 
alleging downward manipulation of spot market onion prices and onion futures contracts 
for January and February of 1956 on the CME); BOB TAMARKIN, THE NEW GATSBYS: 
FORTUNES AND MISFORTUNES OF COMMODITY TRADERS 29 (1985) (“Hardly a day passed, it 
seemed, without somebody trying to corner the onion market or squeeze prices higher or 
push them lower.”). 
 242 Act of Jul. 26. 1955, Pub. L. No. 174, 69 Stat. 375 (1955). 
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fluctuations in the cash price of onions.243  The Committee 
recommended that “futures trading be prohibited if the futures 
market could not be operated so as to prevent injury to onion 
producers.”244  The same recommendation was made by the 
Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, which stated 
that: 
[B]ecause speculative activity in the futures market was apparently 
adversely affecting cash onion prices, Congress added onions to the 
commodities subject to regulation under the Commodity Exchange 
Act . . . .  This has not cured the situation . . . [and i]t now appears 
that speculative activity in the futures markets causes such severe 
and unwarranted fluctuations in the price of cash onions as to require 
complete prohibition of onion futures trading in order to assure the 
orderly flow of onions in interstate commerce.245 
As a result of the Senate and House Committee 
recommendations, on August 28, 1958, Congress passed the 
Onion Futures Act, which banned trading of futures contracts on 
onions.246  Until 2010, the passage of the Onion Futures Act was 
the only time since the Anti-Gold Futures Act that Congress 
imposed an outright ban on a specific commodity futures 
contract.247  Although there had been previous attempts to ban 
futures contracts on other commodity exchanges, these bills had 
been ultimately unsuccessful due to lobbying by congressional 
constituents with agricultural interests.248 
Even though the subject underlying single security futures 
contracts are not commodities, the most recent ban on a specific 
derivative contract prior to the ban on DBOR derivative contracts 
stemmed from the failure of the CFTC and SEC to agree on how 
these instruments were to be regulated.249  The divergent 
opinions of the two agencies led to the Shad-Johnson 
Jurisdictional Accord, which banned trading of single security 
 
 243 See Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Tieken, 178 F. Supp. 779, 781–83 (N.D. Ill. 
1959). 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. 
 246 See 7 U.S.C. § 13-1(a) (1958). 
 247 Jacks, supra note 236. 
 248 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities 
Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279, 329 n.165 (1997) (discussing the lobbying efforts of 
onion and potato farmers in the 1950s).  See also William H. Jones, Church Introduces 
Plan to Ban Trading of All Potato Futures, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1977, at D11 (quoting 
Senator Frank Church as saying, “[t]ime and time again, potato producers from across the 
nation have indicated that they have no desire to have trading in futures.  They are tired 
of being the innocent victims of economic power plays by . . . spectators”); History of the 
CFTC, supra note 239 (noting that on July 21, 1964, Sen. Edmund Muskie introduced a 
bill to ban potato futures, but the bill did not become law). 
 249 CFTC AND SEC—ISSUES RELATED TO THE SHAD-JOHNSON JURISDICTIONAL 
ACCORD, supra note 81, at 5. 
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futures contracts for nearly twenty years.250  This ban was 
eventually lifted, though, when Congress passed the CFMA, and 
today single security futures are jointly regulated by the CFTC 
and SEC.251 
Despite attempts over the years to ban specific commodity 
derivative contracts, the only current commodities on which it is 
unlawful to trade derivatives are onions and DBORs.252  While 
there has been little support to allow trading of onion futures 
over the last half-century, the ban on DBOR derivatives merely 
stems from poor timing. 
III.  THE CASE FOR DBOR DERIVATIVE CONTRACTS 
It is not entirely clear what Congress’ intent was behind 
specifically banning DBOR derivative contracts in the Financial 
Reform Act.  One can assume, however, that after the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis and the financial sector fallout in 2008, investors 
and elected officials became extremely wary about the use of 
derivatives.  As the historical portion of this Article details, 
however, derivatives have been traded in the United States since 
1849.253  While these instruments were originally used as 
hedging devices for individuals and organizations involved in the 
agricultural sector, in the 1970s, derivatives began to be used by 
financial institutions, and the character of these devices 
expanded.254 
 
 250 Shad-Johnson Jurisdictional Accord, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409, 1409–10 
(1982) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii)(II–III) (1994)).  See also 7 U.S.C. § 2(C)(i–ii)(I–III) 
(2006) (“the Commission shall have no jurisdiction to designate a board of trade as a 
contract market for any transaction whereby any party to such transaction acquires any 
put, call, or other option on one or more securities (as defined in section 77b(1) of title 15 
or section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)] on 
January 11, 1983), including any group or index of such securities, or any interest therein 
or based on the value thereof”);; Sanford A. Fine, Back To the (Single Stock) Future: The 
New Regulatory Framework Governing Single-Stock Futures Trading, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 
513, 515 n.8 (2002) (noting that 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii)(II–III) (1994) codifies “a portion of the 
Shad-Johnson Accord concerning the prohibition on trading futures on an individual 
security or in a narrow-based index”);; CFTC & SEC—ISSUES RELATED TO THE SHAD-
JOHNSON JURISDICTIONAL ACCORD, supra note 81, at 5–6 (“These three CEA amendments 
led to a dispute between SEC and CFTC that was eventually resolved through the Shad-
Johnson Jurisdictional Accord. . . .  [T]he accord prohibited futures (and options thereon) 
on single corporate and municipal securities.”). 
 251 Dean Kloner, The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 29 SEC. REG. 
L.J. 286, 293 (2001). 
 252 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1659, § 721(a)(4) (2010) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a). 
 253  Gary Gensler, History of Derivative Regulation, Culprit OTCs, 
COMMODITYONLINE, (July 2, 2010, 3:35 PM), http://www.commodityonline.com/news/ 
History-of-derivatives-regulation-culprit-OTCs-29636-3-1.html; Dodd, supra note 156, 
at 1. 
 254 See EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & MICHAEL C. EHRHARDT, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 822 (Jack W. Calhoun et al. eds., 12th ed. 2008); FINANCIAL CRISIS 
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Many people analogize the trading of derivatives to 
gambling.255  This suggestion could not be further from the truth, 
however.  As Nobel prize winning economist Vernon L. Smith 
stated, “[g]ambling involves the deliberate creation of artificial 
zero-sum opportunities to engage in risk taking decisions that 
redistribute existing resources.”256  Professor Smith continued, 
“[DBOR derivative contracts] are in the class of variable-sum 
stock and derivatives’ markets in which information on the 
future outcome of productive and technological activities is 
dispersed, uncertain, and rendered valuable to society when 
aggregated into prices [such as agricultural commodities].”257  
While some may find it difficult to understand what a DBOR 
futures contract has in common with a wheat futures contract, 
the fact remains that both of these instruments provide 
individuals with opportunities to hedge their financial risk.258 
 
INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT OVERVIEW ON DERIVATIVES 3 (2010), 
available at http://www.fcic.gov/reports/pdfs/2010-0630-psr-derivative-overview.pdf; Rob 
Kirby, Understanding Derivatives to Understand the Credit Crisis, MARKET ORACLE 
(Oct. 20, 2008, 5:23 PM), http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article6890.html; Thomas F. 
Siems, 10 Myths About Financial Derivatives, CATO INSTITUTE, (Sept. 11, 1997), 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-283.html. 
 255 Shahien Nasiripour, Derivatives Just “A Sophisticated Form Of Gambling,” U.S. 
Senators Say; Propose Bill Allowing State Gambling Laws To Apply, HUFFINGTON POST 
(last updated Nov. 10, 2009, 11:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/10/ 
derivatives-just-a-sophis_n_352994.html (“In describing the complex and little-understood 
world of derivatives trading as ‘a sophisticated form of gambling,’ three U.S. Senators 
proposed legislation that would enable state gambling regulators and attorneys general to 
examine the practice.”);; Jane D'Arista & Gerald Epstein, Congress Should Force Big 
Banks to Stop Gambling With Our Money, ALTERNET (May 10, 2010), 
http://www.alternet.org/economy/146806/congress_should_force_big_banks_to_stop_gambl
ing_with_our_money/ (“The derivatives business is straight gambling.”). 
 256 Public Comment of Vernon L. Smith in Response to Concept Release on the 
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts (May 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/frcomment/08-
004c001.pdf. 
 257 Id. 
 258 For a discussion on the benefits of wheat futures contracts, see Mark B. Major & 
Alan May, MontGuide: The Futures Hedge (Short Hedge), MONT. STATE UNIV. (Dec. 2009), 
http://msuextension.org/publications/AgandNaturalResources/MT200919AG.pdf (noting 
that a wheat futures (short) hedge can be beneficial because, “[b]y locking in the futures 
price on the futures market, downside price risk is eliminated”);; Mykel Taylor et al., 
Hedging v. Forward Contracting for Wheat, AGMANAGER.INFO (September 2003), 
http://www.agmanager.info/marketing/publications/marketing/forwardcontracting.asp 
(“When the cash price at harvest is higher than the expected price (i.e., price increases), 
the loss in the [wheat] futures market reduces the actual price received.  When the price 
at harvest is lower than the expected price (i.e., price decreases), the gain in the [wheat] 
futures market offsets the loss in the cash market and thus increases the actual price 
received.  It is this variation in price from which the producer is protected by hedging in 
the futures market.”).  For a discussion on the benefits of DBOR futures contracts, see Dr. 
Kris, Movie Futures Face Big Questions, SEEKING ALPHA, (March 8, 2010), 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/192390-movie-futures-face-big-questions (“[A] company’s 
movie futures will create liquidity and provide studios with a hedging mechanism besides 
making the little guy an active participant.”); Ryan Pertz, Fast Forward: Distributing 
Film Risk, NEWBIZVIEWS (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.newbizviews.com/2010/04/28/fast-
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Film companies, like any other commercial entity (e.g., a 
farmer) must sell what they produce at a profit in order to 
continue to exist as a viable business.  Film companies 
specifically are in the business of selling successful films.259  
Unfortunately, if film companies fail to produce enough 
successful films, they will not be long for the industry.260  To put 
it in economic terms, a film company has an incentive to produce 
quality films.  Because film companies have this incentive, one 
could certainly envision a situation where such an entity would 
take a long position in a film futures contract.  If a film company 
truly believed in their film, there would be no reason not to take 
such a position, because they would, in essence, have the 
opportunity to “double down”261 on their product.  Not only would 
the film company generate revenue from the initial sale of the 
movie, but if the movie generated enough box office receipts, the 
film company would earn even more money when it collected on 
its long positions. 
On the flip side, film financiers, distributors, and theaters 
generate their revenue from box office receipts.262  Thus, in order 
for these individuals and companies to remain viable, enough 
revenue must be generated at the box office to at least break 
even.  Because there is always the risk that a film will “flop,” 
these individuals and companies would enter into a short 
position to hedge against this risk.  If a film failed to produce 
 
forward-distributing-film-risk/ (“Like commodity forwards, movie futures can serve a 
practical purpose: they could enable the primary risk bearers (movie financiers in this 
case) to distribute a portion of their risk.”). 
 259 See Shannon McCoy, The Government Tunes in to Tune Out the Marketing of 
Violent Entertainment to Kids: The Media Violence Labeling Act, The Media Marketing 
Accountability Act and the First Amendment, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 237, 245 (2002) 
(“Film studios promote and advertise films to make money, not merely to express 
themselves artistically.”). 
 260 See Moore, Financing Drama, supra note 144, at 26. 
 261 This author is fully aware that he is using a gambling phrase in an article that 
tries to dispel the myth that derivatives are nothing more than a form of gambling. 
 262 Aljean Harmetz, Where Movie Ticket Income Goes, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 1987), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/28/movies/where-movie-ticket-income-
goes.html (“The distributor of a movie—the studio that releases a film to theaters—
usually ends up with less than fifty percent of the money paid for tickets.”);; Mark Litwak, 
Protecting Film Investors, MARK LITWAK’S ENTM’T LAW RESOURCES, 
http://www.marklitwak.com/articles/general/protecting_film_investors.html (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2010) (“[A]n intelligent investment in a motion picture can earn substantial 
returns.  While film investments are risky, the potential return from a hit can be 
enormous.  No [sic] only can the film earn revenue from box office receipts, but there are 
many ancillary sources of income.”);; Sarah Morgan, 10 Things Movie Theaters Won’t Tell 
You, YAHOO! FINANCE (Dec. 31, 2009), http://finance.yahoo.com/family-home/article/ 
108494/things-theaters-wont-tell-you?mod=family-kids_parents (“[G]enerally speaking, 
theaters pay somewhere between 35 and 70 percent of box office receipts to the studio as a 
film-rental fee . . . .  In most cases, the studio takes the biggest cut in the first week, and 
the percentage drops from there.”). 
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enough revenue at the box office to equal these entities’ 
investments, the settlement on their DBOR contracts would, in 
theory, provide the capital necessary to allow the entities to 
break even. 
If the long and short positions of these individuals and 
organizations are in balance, enough liquidity would be available 
in these markets to encourage others (e.g., marketing partners, 
minor investors, film talent, speculators) to buy and sell these 
same contracts.  A DBOR market, which would clearly provide 
information about the expected success or failure of a film, would 
allow commercial and speculative investors to rebalance their 
particular positions as needed. 
Movie studios may argue that no incentive exists for them to 
short a movie because filmmakers would decide never to work 
with that studio again; the theory being that if a studio does not 
believe a film will produce sufficient box office revenue, it must 
not believe in the quality of a filmmaker’s work.  This, of course, 
is the basis for the natural long position of the studios.  However, 
as stated earlier, only about one-in-three films are expected to 
have the potential to come close to breaking even.263  Thus, even 
if a studio did short its own film because it did not believe 
sufficient box office revenue would be generated, filmmakers 
would never know about this position because DCMs and the 
CFTC are kept anonymous.264 
As the CFTC observed in its order approving MDEX’s DBOR 
contract, DBOR numbers—the majority of which are prepared 
automatically by Rentrak—are not subject to manipulation.265  
The small percentage of call-around data,266 even if it were 
attempted to be manipulated by the theaters or studios, would 
have a de minimis effect on the settlement data for these futures 
 
 263 Moore, Financing Drama, supra note 144, at 26. 
 264 7 U.S.C.A § 6g(b) (West 2009) (“Every registered entity shall maintain daily 
trading records.  The daily trading records shall include such information as the 
Commission shall prescribe by rule.”);; § 12(a)(1) (stating that, “except as otherwise 
specifically authorized in this chapter, the Commission may not publish data and 
information that would separately disclose the business transactions or market positions 
of any person and trade secrets or names of customers”). 
 265 Statement of the Commission, supra note 185, at 5–6. 
 266 See Richard Shilts, Director, Division of Market Oversight on Meeting of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission to Discuss: Futures and Binary Options Based 
on Box Office Receipts, (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/ 
SpeechesTestimony/shiltstatement051910.html (“A small amount of box office receipts are 
not reported through Rentrak; they are reported directly from those theatres to the 
distributor.  This data is referred to as call-around data.  Once the distributor sums the 
Rentrak and call-around receipt data, that number is reported back to Rentrak which in 
turn distributes it to Variety Magazine, BoxOfficeMojo.com, and other news organizations 
and interested parties.”). 
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contracts.267  Assuming arguendo that Rentrak’s numbers could 
potentially be manipulated, there would be no incentive for 
Rentrak to do so because it has no direct interest in DBOR 
numbers.268  The fact that DBOR settlement prices are linked to 
a third party index is no different from agricultural commodity 
derivative contracts (e.g., feeder cattle futures which are linked 
to USDA indices).269  The reputation of Rentrak, like the USDA, 
is important, however.  Rentrak numbers have been a marketing 
tool that film studios have used for more than twenty years.270  It 
is highly unlikely that Rentrak would start falsifying DBOR 
numbers now.  The price basis for DBOR contract settlement, 
therefore, is not in question, and Congress, like the CFTC, should 
not be concerned about the potential for inaccurate settlement of 
these contracts. 
Perhaps the greatest reason for allowing DBOR derivatives 
trading is the potential increase in capital that would flow into 
the film industry.  As noted earlier, film financing has begun to 
dry up over the past few decades.271  This is directly correlated to 
the risk associated with financing a film.272  If investors could be 
assured that they would be able to hedge this risk, they would 
certainly be more likely to invest in the film industry.273  
Additionally, by increasing the amount of capital available to the 
film industry, the number of motion pictures exported from the 
U.S. would increase.274  The potential for increased film 
financing, along with the ability for individuals and 
organizations whose revenue streams are directly tied to DBORs, 
is reason enough for Congress to repeal the ban on DBOR 
derivatives and allow trading of these contracts. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether DBOR derivative contracts fail due to lack of 
interest should be left to the exchange participants to decide, not 
 
 267 Id. at 6. 
 268 Id. 
 269 See id. at 6–7. 
 270 See About Rentrak, RENTRAK CORP., http://www.rentrak.com/section/corporate/ 
about/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2010). 
 271 Moore, Raising Film Financing, supra note 143, at 4. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Moore, Financing Drama, supra note 144, at 26. 
 274 See, e.g., NAT’L EXPORT INITIATIVE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE NATIONAL 
EXPORT INITIATIVE: THE EXPORT PROMOTION CABINET’S PLAN FOR DOUBLING U.S. 
EXPORTS IN FIVE YEARS 40 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/nei_report_9-16-10_full.pdf (outlining recommendations for doubling U.S. exports 
over the next five years).  Given the emphasis on increasing U.S. exports, it seems curious 
to this author that legislation potentially limiting the number of exports—which is what 
could potentially occur to feature films by banning box office derivatives—would be 
enacted. 
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Congress.  DBORs, along with onions, are the only commodities 
on which derivatives trading is currently unlawful.  When onion 
futures were banned in 1958, however, it was the result of a 
three year long process that included hearings before multiple 
congressional committees.275  DBOR contracts, however, had the 
simple misfortune of poor timing.  Were it not for the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis and the resulting economic fallout, it is unlikely 
that Congress would have given the CFTC’s decision to allow 
trading of DBOR derivatives a second thought.  Nonetheless, 
Congress—who clearly arrived late to the table—decided that 
simply because DBOR derivatives are similar to the CDSs that 
helped lead to the economic collapse in 2008, they deserved to be 
banned.  This is undoubtedly the wrong approach to take.  
Unfortunately, the ban on DBOR derivatives may be a sign of 
things to come.  In an environment where the vast majority of 
new derivative exchanges and contracts are highly regulated by 
the CFTC and SEC, congressional stifling of financial innovation 
is both unnecessary and potentially harmful to a financial 
industry that could lose future markets to international 
competitors. 
 
 275 See 90 Years of Blood, Sweat and Onions, ONION WORLD, (July/Aug. 2003), 
http://www.columbiapublications.com/onionworld/julyaug2003.htm#ow29 (“In the 1950s 
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was the vehicle that moved the U.S. Congress to pass law that would ban futures 
trading . . . .  Seven bills were presented to Congress to have it discontinued, countless 
letters were written in opposition and members of the industry traveled to Washington, 
D.C., to appear before congressional committees.  Futures trading was officially banned in 
1958.”);; History of the CFTC, supra note 239 (noting that following a complaint regarding 
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